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THE ICC'S EXIT PROBLEM
REBECCA]. HAMILTON*

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was neuer meant to supplant
the domestic prosecution of international crimes. And yet, the Court is now
entering its second decade of operations in four African nations, with no
plan for exit in sight. While the literature on the ICC to date has devoted
much space to considerations involved in the Court's entry into situations,
this Article identifies the looming need for the ICC to consider when and how
to exit situations. However, the consideration of exit revea/,s an immediate
problem: While the Court's constitutive document, the Rome Statute, pro
vides ample guidance on when the Court may enter a new situation, it offers
no explicit guidance on exit whatsoever. This Article fills that lacuna, pro
posing a framework to guide exit decisionmaking that draws on both statu
tory and policy prescriptions, as well as insights from analogous interna
tional institutions. The Article is driven by a concern that the failure to start
planning for exit undercuts the Court's placement within a system of com
plementarity, creating a moral hazard in which domestic justice systems
(and those who could support them) come to rely on the ICC in lieu of
developing their own capacity to prosecute international crimes. Framed in
the positive, planning for exit could present an opportunity to catalyze the
development of domestic justice systems and provide a secondary benefit of
alleviating the current strain on the Court's resources. The consideration of
exit decisionmaking also provides a new occasion to assess and extend our
understanding of prosecutorial discretion, an issue that the Court has been
grappling with since its inception. This Article argues that the Prosecutor's
ability to navigate exit in a way that is acceptable to the Court's key stake
holders will be crucial to the ICC's ability to implement its mandate over the
long term.
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Since this Article was finalized, the ICC Prosecutor informed the U.N.
Security Council that she was suspending operations in the Daifur
situation. Citing a lack of support from states, especially for the
enforcement of arrest warrants, and highlighting resource constraints,
the Prosecutor's statement marked the first time the ICC has publicly
announced any halt in its activities. Although suspension is distinct
from exit (only the former leaves the door open for the resumption of
investigative activities in the same situation), the parallels between the
two are significant enough that issues of timing, benchmarks, and
process raised in this Article can and should be considered in relation
to Daifur and any other situation where the Prosecution is considering
suspending operations. Suspension might also be thought of as an
alternative to exit, akin to the redeployment model addressed in this
Article, but distinguishable in the Daifur situation by virtue of the
reasoned and public statement that accompanied the decision. Such
public notification can transform suspension into a positive
development, alleviating pressure on the Court's resources in a
transparent manner, shielding the Prosecution from allegations of
inefficiency, and potentially shaming states into increased cooperation
with the Court. But as with other alternatives to exit considered in the
body of this Article, suspension does not create strong incentives with
respect to complementarity. That remains something that only a fully
fleshed-out exit strategy can do.
INTRODUCTION

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was never meant
to supplant the domestic prosecution of international crimes.
Situated within a system of complementarity, this "court of last
resort" was designed to operate only in instances where states
themselves are unable or unwilling to prosecute. As the Court
pursues its tenth year of operations in both the Central Afri-
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can Republic and Sudan, and its eleventh year in the Demo
cratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, it is an appropriate
juncture to recall this aspect of the Court's design.
This Article argues that to avoid the specter of perpetual
presence in every situation it enters, the ICC needs to start
considering when and how to exit existing situations. 1 The
problem, however, is that existing statutory sources provide no
guidance on how the Court might go about doing this. 2 To fill
this void, I propose a framework for exit decisionmaking that
is benchmark-driven but acknowledges that the Court may
sometimes need to exit a situation under conditions of only
partial success, or even failure.
Both the identification of exit as an issue and the pro
posed framework through which to guide exit decisionmaking
mark a new direction within the scholarship on the ICC, which
to date has devoted much attention to issues related to the
Court's entry into new situations. Entry has also been a preoc
cupation of the Court itself; however, it is time to update this
focus, recognizing that the Court today is quite different from
what it was at its inception in 2002.
When the ICC's founding Prosecutor, Luis Moreno
Ocampo, took office in June 2003, his first order of business
was to find situations to investigate. 3 He began his work against
an inauspicious backdrop, and it was unclear whether the
Court would ever secure enough cases to become fully func1. "Situation" is a term of art used in the Rome Statute. It refers to the
location of the alleged crimes under investigation. Rod Rast.an, Situation and
Case: Defining the Parameters, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CouRT AND
COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 422 (Carsten Stahn &
Mohamed M. El Zeidy eds., 2011). It is distinct from the term "cases," which
refers to the particular crimes prosecuted within a situation. Id. at 437-38.
2. Under the statutory interpretation advanced in this Article, the deci
sion to exit would be taken by the Prosecutor. See infra Part II. But this Arti
cle refers to ICC exit, rather than prosecution exit, since from the perspec
tive of most of the Court's stakeholders, the internal divisions between differ
ent arms of the Court are quite opaque.
3. Paul Seils, among the earliest of the lawyers to join the Office of the
Prosecutor, notes that even in more recent times, "there remains a sense of
'looking for business.'" Paul Seils, Making Complementarity Work: Maximizing
the Limited Ro'le of the Prosecutor, in 2 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND
COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 989 (Carsten Stahn &
Mohamed M. El Zeidy eds., 2011).
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tional. 4 But fast-forward to 2014, and the Court finds itself in a
very different situation. 5 While still deeply controversial in
many quarters, the Court has secured itself a prominent place
on the international stage. Far from being short of cases, its
docket is now bulging. Yet, such success raises new challenges,
including the question of exit.
The term "exit," as used in this Article, refers to public
notification that the ICC is ceasing new operations in any of
the situations in which it is already involved. It does not mean
that existing arrest warrants would be nullified, or that defend
ants already subject to arrest warrants would not proceed to
trial (although, as discussed later, under appropriate circum
stances, such trials could potentially take place at the domestic
level instead of at the ICC).
In theory, exit could be unspoken: The Court could end
active operations in a situation without making any public an
nouncement to that effect. Indeed, one might argue that such
a scenario would be optimal, in the sense that those who had
committed crimes but had not yet been indicted would be un
likely to draw attention to themselves by committing further
crimes, fearing future prosecution, and those considering
committing future war crimes would be deterred, fearing they
would become subjects of an ICC investigation.
4. Writing soon after the Rome Statute was adopted, future U.S. Ambas
sador to the United Nations John Bolton argued the Court should be left "to
the obscurity it so richly deseives." John Bolton, Courting Danger: What's
Wrong with the International Criminal Court?, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
(Dec. 1, 1998), http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/inter
national-organizations/courting-danger/. Throughout the first term of the
Bush administration, the United States appeared to be doing everything it
could to emasculate the Court. See, e.g., American Service Members Protec
tion Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421 et seq. (2002) (cutting economic and
military aid to countries who had joined the ICC without signing a bilateral
immunity agreement with the United States); Draft U.N. Security Council
Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/2002/712 Qune 30, 2002) (proposal to extend the
U.N. peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina vetoed by the United States
on the grounds that nationals of states not party to the ICC had not been
granted immunity from ICC prosecution in the draft resolution).
5. The U.S. position has warmed to a stance best described as construc
tive engagement, and 122 countries have joined the court. States Parties to the
&me Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_
menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the
%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Aug. 22, 2014).
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On balance, however, such de facto exit seems ill-advised.
Firstly, it works against transparency, one of the principles gen
erally seen as contributing to the legitimacy of international
organizations. 6 Secondly, any deterrent effect of perceived
ICC presence in a situation will inevitably wear thin once it
becomes clear that the ICC is not, in fact, still conducting op
erations. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the absence
of a public announcement of withdrawal also precludes the
possibility of exit serving as a catalyst for capacity-building or
ganizations, whether U.N. actors or private non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), to ramp up their efforts to support the
domestic system to handle any residual cases in the situation,
or indeed any new cases in the future. And, ultimately, deter
rence by virtue of a functioning domestic system is a more sus
tainable goal than deterrence by way of an expensive and dis
tant court.
At present, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has no
exit strategy in place for any of the situations in which it oper
ates. This is problematic because it risks undermining the sys
tem of complementarity, so integral to the design of the
Court, by creating a moral hazard scenario whereby domestic
justice systems default towards dependency on the ICC for the
prosecution of international crimes. This was not a risk that
early watchers of the Court foresaw. Most believed that the
possibility of the ICC's entering a given state would spur that
state's government to take up its own prosecutions, saving it
self from ICC encroachment. 7 To date, however, the reverse
seems to have been more common, with ICC involvement de
creasing incentives for domestic prosecutions. 8 In light of this
6. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administra
tive Law, 68 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 (2005) (defining global administra

tive law as encompassing mechanisms to ensure that, inter alia, adequate
standards of transparency are met).
7. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The Inter

national Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International
justice, 49 HARv. INT'L LJ. 53, 57 (2008) (hoping for "a virtuous circle in

which the Court stimulates the exercise of domestic jurisdiction through the
threat of international intervention").
8. See SARAH NoUWEN, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE C AT
ALYSING EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA AND Su
DAN 396-99 (2014) (finding that the assumptions underlying initial expecta
tions that the ICC would have a catalyzing effect on domestic prosecutions
must be reviewed, both because the normative force of complementarity has
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development, this Article argues that a well-constructed exit
strategy has the potential to revitalize the complementarity sys
tem that the Court's founders hoped would be more active
than it has been in the first decade of the Court's existence.
Exit would also generate a secondary benefit by releasing
pressure on the Court's current resources. In 2009, the prose
cution's 217 staff members were prosecuting eight cases. In
the projected budget for 2014, 217 staff were responsible for
prosecuting twenty cases. 9 While one should expect the Court
to become more efficient in its operations over time, such
stretching of resources cannot be limitless, and already com
plaints have been lodged that the mismatch between the
Court's resources and the number of situations it is involved in
has led to staff burnout and an over-reliance on secondary
sources of information that may not stand up at trial. 10 By exit
ing situations in appropriate circumstances, the Court would
been undermined by its lack of legal obligation, and because the states' cost
benefit analysis of undertaking domestic prosecutions to avoid ICC interven
tion has not played out as expected). With respect to the latter, the assumed
cost to the sovereignty of the state in which the ICC intervenes may in fact be
seen by the state as a benefit, as has been the case in Uganda, where the
government has been able to outsource prosecution of a rebel group to the
ICC while avoiding ICC scrutiny of alleged crimes by its own government
forces. And even in situations where the sovereignty cost to the state is high,
as with the ICC's intervention in Sudan, where the ICC has investigated gov
ernment activity, these costs can be avoided by means other than comple
mentarity, such as by the state's refusal to execute arrest warrants. These
findings run contrary. to the expectations of early writers who assumed that,
faced with the threat of ICC intervention, states would prefer to undertake
domestic prosecutions.
9. 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, AsSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES TO
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICIAL
REcoRDs 34, ICC-ASP/7/20 (Nov. 2008), availab/,e at http://icc-cpi.int/icc
docs/asp_docs/A.pdf; cf. 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CouRT, AssEMBLY OF
STATES PARTIES TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICIAL RECORDS
190, ICC-ASP/12/20 (Nov. 2013), availab/,e at http://www.icc-cpi.int/icc
docs/asp_docs/ASP12/OR/ICC-ASP-12-20-ENG-OR-Vol-I-18Decl230.AV
.pdf.
10. See Elena Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, 14 UCLA]. INT'L L. & FOR
EIGN AFF. 121, 130-133 (2009) (discussing the problems associated with the
ICC's reliance on third parties to perform investigations); AM. UNIV. WAR
CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, INVESTIGATIVE MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIES, AND
TECHNIQUES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT'S OFFICE OF THE PROSE
CUTOR 4, 12 (2012), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/
icc/documents/ICCReportl6.pdf (finding that "investigators hired by the
OTP have left the Office due to burn out resulting from being over-
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be in a better position to accommodate the demands on its
resources.
Given the scale of crimes generally involved in situations
the ICC enters, it is unlikely that exit would occur only when
all possible suspects in a situation have been investigated and
prosecuted by the ICC. And while, in an ideal world, exit
would not occur unless remaining potential suspects were be
ing investigated and prosecuted by domestic authorities in lieu
of the ICC, even this may be an unrealistic goal to have for all
situations, given the debilitated state of some domestic justice
systems and the time necessary to get them to a point where
they can handle the investigation and prosecution of interna
tional crimes. Constraints on resources and cooperation fail
ures may mean that, in many instances, exit will not be simply
the reverse of the statutory conditions of entry. In other words,
although the Court enters situations only when domestic jus
tice systems are unable or unwilling to prosecute, 11 it may
need to exit situations before the domestic system is able and
willing to prosecute. As a result, exit decisionmaking will need
to factor in the possibility of suboptimal exit scenarios, in situa
tions where there is no guarantee that remaining suspects will
be investigated or prosecuted by either the ICC or domestic
authorities.
While this Article argues that the Court must start consid
ering exit, it recognizes that the lack of guidance from existing
sources poses a significant problem for the ICC, which must
develop its own process for exit decisionmaking. With respect
to the question of how to exit a situation once a decision to
exit has been made, there is a growing body of best practices
to draw on from the experiences of the closure of the Interna
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (IC1Y) and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (!CTR) (to
gether, "the ad hoc tribunals") .12
stretched" and describing the reliance on secondary sources as "problem
atic").
11. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 1,
2002, 2187 U.N.T .S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
12. Indeed, the ICC's legislative body, the Assembly of States Parties,
placed the question of exit on its annual meeting for the first time at the end
of 2013 with a paper to discuss what lessons such tribunals may have for the
ICC. See Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Court
on Complementarity: Completion of ICC Activities in a Situation Country,
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But consideration of how to exit does not address the an
tecedent, and perhaps more challenging issue, of when to exit.
And on this question, the ad hoc tribunals have little to offer,
since their exit decisions have been made by the political body
that established and funded the tribunals-the U.N. Security
Council. By contrast, the decision to exit a situation at the ICC
appears to fall within the discretion of the Prosecutor. 13
With the Court's constitutive document, the Rome Stat
ute, providing no direct guidance on exit, the degree of
prosecutorial discretion involved in the decision to exit is sig
nificant. And while the first decade of literature on the ICC
focused heavily on the higher degree of discretion the ICC
Prosecutor had to enter situations as compared with his coun
terparts in the ad hoc tribunals, 14 this Article is the first to rec
ognize that an even greater degree of discretionary decision
making is involved when it comes to exit.
ICC-ASP/12/32 (Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/ asp_docs/ ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-32-ENG.pdf. This is a welcome, if
belated, development. However, the report failed to recognize that the
experiences of these temporary tribunals provide little guidance on the
question of when the ICC, as a permanent institution, should exit a
situation.
13. The question of who should decide when the ICC exits a situation
is explored in Part II.
14. See, e.g., Richard J. Goldstone & Nicole Fritz, "In the Interests of
justice" and Independent Referral: The ICC Prosecutor's Unprecedented Powers, 13

LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 655, 657 (2000) (arguing that the degree of discretion
afforded to the ICC Prosecutor constitutes a "fundamental departure"
from the ad hoc tribunals); William A. Schabas, Victor's Justice: Selecting

"Situations" at the Inter
national Criminal Court, 43

J. MARsHALL L. REv. 535, 541 (2010) (noting
that "for the first time, we have an international criminal tribunal
where the choice of situations for prosecution is the prerogative of a
judicial official within the institution and not a political body outside it").
Unlike the ICC, the ad hoc tribunals were limited to investigating in
situations established ex ante by the U.N. Security Council. For instance, the
Council limited the geo graphic jurisdiction of the ICTR to Rwanda,
meaning that the ICTR Prosecutor had no discretion to pursue crimes that
took place over the border in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
However, this is not to say that there are no checks on the ICC Prosecutor's
discretion. The Rome Statute that established the Court defines the
geographic and temporal limits of the Court's jurisdiction, and when the
Prosecutor seeks to open an investigation into a situation proprio motu, a
Pre-Trial Chamber composed of three international judges must approve
the decision. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 15. The Pre-Trial Chamber
can also review the decision of the Prosecutor not to pro ceed with an
investigation or prosecution if the decision was taken solely "in the interests
ofjustice." Id. art. 53(3)(b).
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The dearth of scholarship on the question of exit in this
field parallels the comparatively greater attention that has
been placed on entry, as compared to exit, in other interna
tional interventions until quite recently. 15 This Article argues
that, as scholars and practitioners in these other settings are
finding, the Prosecutor's ability to navigate exit in a way that is
acceptable to the Court's key stakeholders will be crucial to
the perceived legitimacy of the ICC's work going forward. This
is particularly important for a Court that is entirely dependent
on others, including governments and civil society organiza
tions, for the access it needs to investigation sites and wit
nesses, 16 and for the enforcement powers required to execute
its judgm ents. 17 In short, a poorly managed exit from one situ
ation is likely to impact the ICC's ability to enter new situations
in the future.
Part I of this Article describes what I term a "complemen
tarity imperative" driving the need to start considering exit. It
argues that for the Court to remain in situations without devel
oping any exit strategy risks creating a moral hazard scenario
whereby domestic justice systems come to rely on the ICC for
the prosecution of international crimes in their territories
and, as a result, neither the domestic justice systems nor other
actors who could help to build the capacity of those systems
have an incentive to plan for prosecuting international crimes
domestically. It also observes that exit would have the secon
dary benefits of protecting the Court against perceptions of
inefficiency and of alleviating some of the pressure on the
Court's resources. It finally considers whether there are any
alternatives to exit, describing two approaches other than exit
through which the Prosecutor, currently Gambian lawyer
Fatou Bensouda, could align workload and resources in a
15. The first book to look systematically at exit strategies with respect to
international institutions only came out in 2012. See generally ExIT STRATEGIES
AND STATE BUILDING (Richard Caplan ed., 2012).
16. See, e.g., Jacob Katz Cogan, The Probl,em of Obtaining Evidence for Interna
tional Criminal Courts, 22 HuM. RTs. Q. 404, 405 (2000) (arguing that interna
tional criminal courts "depend on states to provide them with evidence or
access to evidence").
17. See, e.g., Burke-White, supra note 7, 60-61 (noting the ICC's lack of
enforcement mechanisms and quoting the ICC Prosecutor as stating that
"ultimately, the decision to uphold the law will be the decision of States Par
ties").
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world of limited budgets: The Prosecutor could decline to
enter new situations or she could decide to under-staff existing
situations in order to free the resources to enter new situa
tions. However, the costs to the mandate and credibility of the
Court that are likely to flow from either of these approaches
render both of them problematic. More importantly, neither
addresses the fundamental concern about creating positive in
centives toward complementarity. Only exit planning can ad
dress this issue.
Having established the importance of exit, Part II turns to
the core problem facing the ICC: how to develop a decision
making process for exit in the absence of clear statutory gui
dance. Starting with the question of who should make the de
cision to exit, this Part argues that the decision to exit falls
within the discretion of the Prosecutor. It then reviews the ex
isting literature on prosecutorial discretion at the ICC in order
to identify problems the Prosecutor has faced with discretion
ary decisionmaking and to extract potential lessons that might
be usefully applied to exit decisions. Next, this Part turns to a
search for comparative examples, distinguishing ICC exit from
the exits undertaken by the ad hoc tribunals, and arguing that
an ICC exit might most readily be analogized to exit from a
U.N. peacekeeping operation. Like U.N. peacekeeping, the
perceptions of the ICC's credibility flowing from its actions in
one location have an impact on its ability to enter different
locations in the future. The emphasis, then, is less on the ICC
as a court, and more on the ICC as a permanent international
institution.
Finally, Part III moves from problem to solution. First, it
draws together both statutory and policy prescriptions to pro
pose a working definition of success for the purposes of exit. It
then uses insights from the U.N. peacekeeping context to de
velop a decisionmaking framework for exit that is guided by
substantive benchmarks, rather than hard deadlines. While
completion of cases is the goal, the timeline for considering
exit begins much earlier than the end of a case, and the Prose
cutor should engage in a continual process of assessment to
determine whether benchmarks such as investigative access
and warrant enforcement are being met, and whether the do
mestic system in question is developing the capacity to under
take its own prosecutions. In developing this framework, it be-
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comes clear that the Court's success with respect to exit cannot
be divorced from the actions of other entities, especially states.
I.

WHY ExIT?

The ICC is a permanent institution. In the absence of any
requirement of institutional closure, such as that facing the ad
hoc tribunals, does the ICC really need to exit any situation?
The answer is yes, for both principled and pragmatic reasons.
The primary reason is what I term the "complementarity im
perative." Remaining permanently in a situation undercuts the
principle of complementarity that lies at the heart of the
Rome Statute. This principle strives toward a scenario in which
states take responsibility for prosecuting international crimes.
Beyond this complementarity concern, operating in any situa
tion without a plan for exit may ultimately undermine the
Court's reputation by opening it to criticism that the duration
of its stay in a situation is the result of inefficiency or, worse
yet, intentional delay. Finally, exit would help to alleviate the
financial constraints currently facing the Court. At present,
the Court's budget is not expanding fast enough to accommo
date the increasing number of situations it is entering, without
some cost to the quality of its work. 18 A decrease in the quality
of the Court's work can, in turn, undermine the credibility of
the Court, and ultimately limit its ability to fulfill its mandate
of ending impunity.
There are, of course, alternative mechanisms to exit for
aligning the Court's resources with its workload, namely, refus
ing to enter new situations or purposely under-staffing existing
ones. But both generate significant problems for the Court's
reputation. One might suggest, then, that the answer is simply
to push for the Court to be given more resources. But even in
a world of unlimited resources, the complementarity impera
tive alone would still point toward the need for the Court to
consider exit.
A.

The Complementarity Imperative

By placing the ICC within a system of complementarity,
the drafting of the Rome Statute marked a distinct and con
scious decision to depart from the model of the ad hoc tribu18. See infra Part LC.I.ii.
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nals that were, in many other respects, the Court's contempo
rary forerunners. The ad hoc tribunals were granted primacy
over relevant domestic jurisdictions in the prosecution of ge
nocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. By contrast,
the ICC was designed to be a "court of last resort" that would
step in only when domestic justice systems were unable or un
willing to undertake genuine prosecutions. As the OTP's 20092012 strategy document explained, "the number of cases that
reach the Court is not a positive measure of effectiveness. Gen
uine investigations and prosecutions of serious crimes at the
domestic level may illustrate the successful functioning of the
Rome system." 19
This principle of complementarity is central to the func
tioning of the international criminal justice system that was
conceived of by the drafters of the Rome Statute. As Carsten
Stahn notes, it is "both unrealistic and undesirable" to imagine
the ICC being able to prosecute all crimes within its jurisdic
tion. 20 As the Court strives toward its ambitious mandate of
putting "an end to impunity," 21 it is clear that domestic systems
must take up their share of the work. Yet by conducting its
operations without any plan for exit, the Court risks becoming
a stand-in for, rather than a catalyst to, the domestic prosecu
tion of international crimes.22
Under the Statute, the Court only enters a situation if the
domestic justice system is unable or unwilling to conduct its
19. Int'! Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutorial Strategy
2009-2012, ,r 79 (Feb. 1, 2010) availab/,e at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdon
lyres/66A8DCDC-3650-45 l 4-AA62-D229D l l 28F65/281506/OTPProsecutori
a!Strategy20092013.pdf.
20. Carsten Stahn, Introduction: Bridges over Troub/,ed Waters?, in l THE IN
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARIIT: FROM THEORY TO
PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 3.
21. Rome Statute, supra note 11, pmbl.
22. By saying there is a risk that the ICC becomes a stand-in for the do
mestic justice system, I do not mean to suggest that the two are interchange
able, or that the ICC can ever serve as a complete substitute for a function
ing domestic justice system. Quite apart from the qualitative differences be
tween the two, the ICC will only ever be able to prosecute a fraction of those
cases that a functioning domestic system could prosecute. But the ICC can
be seen as a stand-in in respect of the fact that for as long as it is present in
an atrocity or post-atrocity situation, other actors, including the domestic
state, can point to the ICC as the mechanism responsible for dealing with
accountability, thereby alleviating its own responsibility in that regard.
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own prosecutions. Thus, at the point of entry, there are no
complementarity concerns. However, with respect to the ques
tion of whether the domestic jurisdiction will become willing
and able to prosecute at a future point, the Court's ongoing
presence in the country risks the creation of a moral hazard
unless it has an exit strategy in place.
Long identified in economic literature, moral hazard sce
narios arise when actors do not have to bear the consequences
of their (in)actions, leading to a reduction in their incentive to
partake in a particular desired behavior. 23 In concrete terms,
one may consider a typical scenario in an insurance setting,
where a "no-fault" policy reduces the incentive for policyhold
ers to protect their belongings relative to what they would have
done in the absence of insurance. 24
Translating this into the ICC scenario, the desired behav
ior in a system of complementarity is the prosecution of inter
national crimes by domestic justice systems. As noted earlier,
the ICC does not enter a situation if the domestic justice sys
tem is able and willing to conduct prosecutions, and so it is not
the ICC's intervention per se that creates the moral hazard. But
by continuing its operations without any exit strategy in place,
the Court reduces the incentive for the domestic system (and
other regional and international actors who might support the
domestic system) to begin planning for the prosecution of
these crimes in the future.
This is the dynamic that played out in the former Yugosla
via, where, in advance of publicizing its exit strategy, the IC1Y
determined that there were no national judicial systems within
Bosnia and Herzegovina that could undertake the prosecution
of international crimes once it closed. 25 Only once the IC1Y
23. For an overview of moral hazard, see generally Mark V. Pauly, The
Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. EcoN. REv. 531 Uune 1968).
24. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure The
ory of Moral Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RisK & lNs. 4, 6 (1983) ("[T]he
more and better insurance that is provided against some contingency, the
less incentive individuals have to avoid the insured event, because the less
they bear the full consequences of their actions.").
25. See Letter Dated 17 June 2002 from the U.N. Secretary-General to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/678 Uune 19, 2002),
(summarizing the ICTY's view that "it would not be possible to for it to refer
cases to the national jurisdictions of that State as they currently are organ
ized and function").
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started publicizing its exit strategy did the tribunal, interna
tional support actors, and the domestic parties themselves be
gin to try and ensure there would be a domestic mechanism
for handling residual cases. Three years after the ICTY first
announced a plan for exit, the War Crimes Division of the
State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina commenced opera
tions. 26
As long as the domestic system and those who could sup
port it believe that the ICC will do the work, these parties do
not bear the consequences of their failure to develop the do
mestic system, and there is a reduced incentive for them to
develop a strategy to take on the prosecution of international
crimes in the future. By contrast, were the Court to signal its
future exit to the domestic justice system and other relevant
parties in any situation in which it operated, both the incentive
and the time would exist for these actors to begin planning for
how the domestic justice system might handle remaining or
future prosecutions in the absence of the ICC.
B. Perceived Inefficiency
The experience of the ad hoc tribunals shows that pa
tience with the pace of war crimes trials is generally limited.
Criticisms have been made of both the ICTY and !CTR that
26. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE FOR ATROCIIT CRIMES: LESSONS OF
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR TRIALS BEFORE THE STATE COURT OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA 1 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/03/
12/justice-atrocity-crimes-O ("[T]he War Crimes Chamber began operations
in March 2005."). The experience of Rwandan justice mechanisms in rela
tion to the !CTR provides a counterpoint to the IC1Y example; however,
Rwanda seems likely to be a sui generis case. Although the Rwandan govern
ment initially supported the idea of an international tribunal for the prose
cution of crimes committed during the 1994 genocide, it ultimately voted
against the U.N. Security Council resolution establishing the tribunal be
cause of the IC1Y's restriction against the death penalty, the presence of the
tribunal outside Rwanda, and the fact that those convicted would serve their
time injails outside of Rwanda. SeeU.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 14,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994) (statement of the Rwandan representa
tive Mr. Bakuramutsa). Thus, far from a moral hazard scenario, the
Rwandan government never depended on the ICTR's existence to begin
with. Concurrently with the ICTR starting its operations, the Rwandan gov
ernment implemented domesticjustice mechanisms to respond to the atroc
ities, firstly through the regular court system, and later through a traditional
system known as Gacaca. There is no comparable situation for any of the
countries in which the ICC currently has operations.
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their operations are too slow; 27 indeed, this has been de
scribed as the consensus view of international tribunals over
all. 28
Independent from the question of whether international
justice is in fact too slow, it certainly flows from the principle
of complementarity inherent in the ICC's design that states
that join and fund the Court do not expect it to remain in any
situation on a permanent basis. On this metric alone, the cur
rent situation, whereby the Court operates without any exit
strategies in place, creates a risk that the states will start to view
the Court as inefficient. Indeed, the absence of an exit strategy
may increase the likelihood of the Court's actually being ineffi
cient. Without any sense of a completion point in a situation,
there is little incentive for the Court to increase the speed of
any of its activities, even when it has the capacity to do so. 29
Ultimately, state perceptions of inefficiency, whether accurate
or not, are problematic on a pragmatic level, because the
Court relies on states for the funding it needs to fulfill its man
date.
C.

Resource Constraints

The Court's budget is growing at a rate that is vastly short
of what is needed to enter more situations while still maintain
ing the quality of the Court's work. Over the past five years,
the OTP's budget has increased by 17 percent, whereas the
number of situations in which it is operating has increased by
100 percent. 30 Although one would hope the OTP has become
27. See, e.g., Richard J. Goldstone & Gary Jonathan Bass, u,ssons from the
International Criminal Tribunals, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNA 
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITI' AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 51, 53
(Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000) (describing delays in the estab
lishment of tribunals as "not just undignified; they are damaging").
28. Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Prosecutions, JusticeDelayed Can
Be]usticeDelivered, 50 HARv. INT'L LJ. 323, 323-324 (2009).
29. The satirical observer of bureaucratic systems, C. Northcote Parkin
son, may well have put it best when he noted that "work expands so as to fill
the time available for its completion." C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson's
Law, EcoNOMIST (Nov. 19, 1955), available at http://www.economist.com/
node/14116121.
30. In 2009, the OTP was active in four situations and had a budget of
24.6 million Euros. 2 INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, AssEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES TO
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICIAL
REcoRDs, ICC-ASP /7/20, supra note 9, at 7. By the end of 2013, the OTP was
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more efficient over time as procedures are streamlined and
staff experience grows, the mismatch between resources and
workload seems greater than one would reasonably expect any
efficiency gains to compensate. 31 According to Dr. Phil Clark,
an expert in international justice, "[t]he court operates on a
shoestring budget, which greatly affects all of its work, particu
larly on-the-ground investigations." 32
1.

Alternatives to Exit

In broad terms, the OTP has three options through which
to align workload with resources. The Prosecutor could decide
not to enter new situations, to enter new situations by rede
ploying staff assigned to existing situations, or to open new sit
uations by exiting existing ones.
a.

No Entry into New Situations

The Rome Statute establishes three ways in which the
OTP can acquire new situations to investigate. A situation can
be referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party or by the U.N.
Security Council, or the Prosecutor can initiate an investiga
tion proprio motu. 33 Thus, although the Prosecutor can decide
not to initiate any new investigations on her own initiative,
State Parties and the U.N. Security Council can continue to
request that she investigate the situations that they refer. 34
active in eight situations and had a budget of 28.3 million Euros. 2 lNT'L
CRIMINAL COURT, AsSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CouRT, OFFICIAL RECORDS, ICC-ASP/12/20, supra
note ,9, at 12.
31. The difficulties the OTP is experiencing with current resource con
straints are documented in its most recent strategic plan. See Int'l Criminal
Court Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2012-2015, 'll 17 (Oct. 11,
2013), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%
20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/policies%20and%20
strategies/Documents/OTP-Strategic-Plan-2012-2015.pdf ("The rotational
model that was used to meet the staffing demand for the Office's investiga
tions and prosecutions has surpassed its limits.").
32. Lilian Ochieng, International Criminal Court Secures Budget Increase,
DAILY NATION Qan. 17, 2014), http://mobile.nation.eo.ke/news/Intema
tional-Criminal-Court-Budget-Increase/-/1950946/2150244/-/fonnat/
xhtml/ -/hieOpOz/-/index.html.
33. Rome Statute, supra note 11, arts. 13-15.
34. Article 53(3)(a) does permit the state (or the U.N. Security Council)
that made the referral to ask the Pre-Trial Chamber to review a decision by
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Despite their ability to make continued requests, neither a
state nor the U.N. Security Council can force the Prosecutor to
open an investigation. Indeed, the Prosecutor's discretion not
to open investigations into situations that political actors have
referred to the Court35 (and to open investigations into situa
tions that political actors have not referred to the Court) 36 is
one of the factors that distinguishes the ICC from the ad hoc
tribunals. 37 Nonetheless, the ICC Prosecutor's discretion not
to open an investigation into a situation that has been referred
to the Court is not unfettered. 38 For both legal and political
reasons, it is difficult to imagine the Prosecutor repeatedly de
clining to open investigations into statutorily viable situations
referred to the Court.
The Rome Statute establishes the factors that the Prosecu
tor must consider in deciding whether to open an investiga
tion. The Statute presumes that the Prosecutor "shall" initiate
an investigation, provided there is a reasonable basis to believe
a crime within the Court's jurisdiction has been committed
and the case is admissible in terms of complementarity. 39 As
suming these grounds are met, the only basis left for the Prose
cutor to decline the investigation is if "[t]aking into account
the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are
nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation
would not serve the interests of justice."40
The current policy of the OTP establishes a strong pre
sumption in favor of prosecution, noting that a decision not to
prosecute in the interests of justice would be "highly excepthe Prosecutor not to open an investigation (or not to prosecute after having
opened an investigation). Id. art. 53(3)(a). The Pre-Trial Chamber may also
request that the Prosecutor review his or her decision. However, there is no
basis for legal sanction should the Prosecutor maintain the decision not to
open an investigation.
35. Id. art. 53.
36. Id. art. 15.
37. Goldstone & Fritz, supra note 14; Schabas, supra note 14.
38. Likewise, the Prosecutor's discretion to open an investigation into a
situation that has not been referred to her is not unfettered. As per article 15
of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor must receive authorization from the
Pre-Trial Chamber for a profrrio motu investigation to proceed. Rome Statute,
supra note 11.
39. Id. art. 53(1).
40. Id. art. 53(l)(c).
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tional."41 But because the Prosecutor has never invoked this
provision, it remains unclear what, in concrete terms, such
"highly exceptional" circumstances might be. What is clear is
that if the Prosecutor decided not to enter a new situation
solely on the basis of "interests of justice" considerations, she
would have to inform the Pre-Trial Chamber, which would
then have the right to review the decision.42 If the judges de
cided to review, then her decision not to enter a new situation
could be maintained only with the Pre-Trial Chamber's confir
mation.43
The Prosecutor could also try to make the case that, as a
consequence of resource constraints, it would not be in the
interests of justice to enter a new situation. An argument
might be that properly staffing a new situation would mean
diverting resources from existing prosecutions, which in tum
would generate delays significant enough to violate the inter
nationally recognized human rights standards incorporated
under article 21 ( 3) of the Rome Statute.44 But it would be up
to the Pre-Trial Chamber to decide whether resource con
straints satisfied the interests-of:iustice exception to the pre
sumption in favor of entering a situation that in all other re
spects met the statutory requirements.
In addition to this significant legal hurdle, the Prosecutor
would likely have political difficulty maintaining a decision not
to enter any new situations until additional funds were allo
cated. Presumably, whenever a political actor-a state or the
41. Int'! Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Prelim
inary Examinations 17 (Nov. 2013), availabl,e at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_
menus/ice/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Documents/ OTP%
20Preliminary%20Examinations/OTP%20-%20Policy%20Paper%20Prelimi
nary%20Examinations%20%202013.pdf.
42. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 53(3)(b).
43. Id. The scenario of the Pre-Trial Chamber overriding the Prosecu
tor's decision not to open an investigation has not yet arisen at the ICC.
However, in such an instance, one could imagine that the Prosecutor, while
formally instructed to open an investigation by the Pre-Trial Chamber,
would have a number of informal options at her disposal, from general bu
reaucratic delay to the avoidance of investigative inquiries likely to lead to
the hardest cases, through which to demonstrate formal compliance while
avoiding a genuinely thorough investigation.
44. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(c),
Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (enumerating the right to be tried without
undue delay).
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U.N. Security Council-refers a situation to the Court, it typi
cally has a strong interest in seeing the Prosecutor open an
investigation, and would complain loudly about a decision not
to do so.45
In and of itself, this would not necessarily be a sign ificant
problem for the Prosecutor; indeed, she should expect states
to express dissatisfaction with her decisionmaking any time
they believe their interests are not being served by the ICC.
Yet, if the Prosecutor cited resource constraints as the grounds
for refusing to enter new situations on a repeated basis, this
would inevitably cause conflict between the Prosecutor and
the Court's legislative body, the Assembly of States Parties
(ASP), which is made up of states that have joined the ICC and
is responsible for financing the Court's work.46
45. Of course, one can also imagine a scenario in which a state, unwilling
to intervene in a conflict situation itself, views a referral to the ICC as a way
of outsourcing the problem while appearing to be "doing something" to ad
dress the situation. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. ScHIFF, BUILDING THE INTERNA
TIONAL CRIMINAL CouRT 232 (2008) (noting that, with respect to the U.N.
Security Council's referral of Darfur to the ICC, "the international commu
nity showed little willingness to take more vigorous action .. . and assign
ment to the Court could be seen as a fig leaf for inaction").
46. The formation of the ASP arises from article 112 of the Rome Stat
ute. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 112. The relationship between the ASP
and the organs of the Court, including the OTP, has not been without ten
sion. For instance, the OTP submitted objections to the ASP's proposal to
form an Independent Oversight Mechanism that would have proprio motu
power to investigate any OTP staff without the Prosecutor's permission. The
Prosecutor argued that this would encroach on the independence of the
OTP. Int'! Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Legal Memorandum on
the IOM Mandate (Nov. 19, 2010), available at http://iccforum.com/media/
background/lectures/ask-former-prosecutor/2010-11-19_OTP_Memoran
dum_on_lOM_Mandate_(English).pdf. The ASP ultimately decided to es
tablish the oversight mechanism despite the Prosecutor's objection. Int'!
Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on the In
dependent Oversight Mechanism, ICC-ASP/9/31 (Dec. 10, 2010), available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP9/ICC-ASP-9-31-ENG.pdf.
The ASP referred to article 112(4) of the Rome Statute, which enables the
ASP to establish subsidiary bodies, "including an independent oversight
mechanism for inspection, evaluation and investigation of the Court, in or
der to enhance its efficiency and economy." Rome Statute, supra note 11, art.
112(4). On the relationship between the Prosecutor and the ASP, see gener
ally David Donat-Cattin, Decision-Making in the International Criminal Court:
Functions of the Assembly of States Parties and Independence of the Court's Judicial
Organs, in 2 ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
CouRT 69-83 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 2004).
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On the positive side, such tensions could lead the ASP to
increase its funding, thus enabling the OTP to take on new
situations without any trade-off in its staffing. But such a dis
pute could also go in the opposite direction. 47 In addition,
there are informal accountability checks on the Prosecutor
through non-signatory states and especially through NGOs. 48
The latter in particular are likely to object to a Prosecutor who
repeatedly refuses to enter new situations. 49
In sum, even if the Prosecutor could satisfy the judges of
the Pre-Trial Chamber that resource constraints meant that it
would not serve the interests of justice to open a new investiga
tion, it would be difficult to sustain repeated refusals to open
investigations without incurring the wrath of both state and
non-state actors who could credibly argue that such an ap
proach cuts against the ICC's mandate of ending impunity.
b.

Entry into New Situations by Redeploying Stafffrom Existing
Situations

A second approach, used by the OTP until 2012, is to re
deploy staff from existing situations without exiting those situ
ations. This policy, described by the OTP as "the flexible use of
resources through expanding or reducing joint teams in accor
dance with needs," sounds sensible enough on paper. 50 But in
47. Both the ASP and the Prosecutor understand that the Rome Statute
permits the ASP, by majority, to remove the Prosecutor from office if he or
she is "unable to exercise the functions required by this Statute." Rome Stat
ute, supra note 11, art. 46(1) (b). It would be perverse, to say the least, for
any member of the ASP to try to have the Prosecutor removed for failure to
enter new situations due to a lack of funding by the ASP. Nonetheless, the
existence of this provision impacts the power dynamics in the relationship
between the Prosecutor and the ASP.
48. See generally Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Ac
countability ofProsecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J.
INT'L LAw 510, 525-34 (2003).
49. While one might foresee some NGOs raising their concerns directly
to the ASP and pushing it to disburse more funds, the NGO community is
not a monolith. If new investigations were repeatedly demanded, and de
nied, in relation to a specific geographic region-Latin America, for in
stance-then it seems reasonable to imagine that Latin American NGOs in
favor of investigations would not hesitate to challenge the Prosecutor for
prioritizing existing situations in Africa over new situations in Latin America.
50. Int') Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Proposed Budget for
2012, ICC-ASP/10/10, ,r 94 Uuly 21, 2011), availab/,e at http://www.icc
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASPlO/ICC-ASP-lO-lO-ENG.pdf.
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practice, the approach has harmed the credibility of the
Court.
As the number of situations the Court enters has in
creased, redeployed staff members have been spread increas
ingly thin. This seems to have had a detrimental impact on the
staff themselves. In a 2008 letter of concern to the Prosecutor,
Human Rights Watch noted that "many investigators exper
ienced 'burn out' because there were simply not enough of
them to handle the rigorous demands for conducting investi
gations."51 The transfer of experienced investigators from a sit
uation further exacerbates the problem of limited resources,
as even if new staff are hired, it takes time to build their knowl
edge of the situation under investigation.
In part as a means of counterbalancing these staff
shortages, the OTP has undertaken labor-saving measures,
such as relying on secondary sources of information in lieu of
first-hand investigations.52 This has discredited the Court's in
vestigations in the eyes of at least some victims. For example,
in the case against the Deputy President of Kenya, William
Ruto, victims and witnesses made a submission to the Pre-Trial
Chamber expressing their concern that the Prosecutor had
not conducted a "meaningful" investigation into their exper
iences.53 According to victims, not only had they not been in
terviewed by the OTP, but they also did not know of anyone in
their area who had been, nor had they heard of the OTP's
having conducted investigations in their region at all.54
By late 2012, the OTP publicly acknowledged the difficul
ties the redeployment model was generating. According to the
OTP's 2012-2015 Strategic Plan, "[t]he rotational model that
was used to meet the staffing demand for the Office's investi51. Human Rights Watch, Letter to the OTP (Sept. 15, 2008), availabl,e at
http:/ /www.article42-3.org/Secret%20Human%20Rights%20Watch%20Let
ter.pdf.
52. See generally AM. UNIV. WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, supra note 10.
53. Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Re
quest by the Victims' Representative for Authorization to Make a Further
Written Submission on the Views and Concerns of Victims, ,r 10 (Nov. 9,
2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/ doc/ docl264964.pdf ("Some of the
victims felt that the failure of the OTP to conduct on-site investigations or to
interview victims could explain why the case as presented by the Prosecution
did not fully accord with the victims' own personal experiences.").
54. Id.
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gations and prosecutions has surpassed its limits. Current staff
ing levels are insufficient to meet all the demands."55
c.

Exiting Existing Situations

For the Prosecutor to refuse to enter new situations until
additional funding is provided would entail significant legal
and political challenges. Yet, as the OTP itself now seems to
recognize, the potential damage to the Court's reputation also
makes redeploying staff from existing situations a fraught path
to pursue.
Under these circumstances, there are two remaining op
tions for addressing the problem of resource constraints. The
first would be the possibility of the ASP significantly increasing
the Court's resources such that it could appropriately staff
every situation. This seems unlikely in practice.56 The second
would be for the Court to exit some situations in order to
enter new ones. While either of these approaches would ad
dress the Court's resource constraints, only the latter ad
dresses the moral hazard that arises when the Court stays, on
an essentially permanent basis, in the situations it enters. In
order to address the complementarity imperative, the Court
must be transparent about the need to consider exiting ex
isting situations in order to enter new ones. Putting this final
approach into practice, however, is not without its own compli
cations.

II.

THE EXIT PROBLEM

Once the necessity for the ICC to start considering exit
has been established, the next question is how it might go
about doing this. The immediately apparent problem, how55. Int'! Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan
2012-2015, supra note 31, at 12.
56. This would start to become a more realistic possibility if the U.N.
Security Council began to provide funding for the referrals it makes to the
ICC. However, this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. Quite
apart from the opposition of Russia and China to the Court, the United
States is prohibited under its own domestic law from providing financial sup
port to the Court. See American Service Members Protection Act of 2002, 22
U.S.C. § 7423(e) (2008) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
agency or entity of the United States Government or of any State or local
government, including any court, may provide support to the International
Criminal Court.").
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ever, is that the Rome Statute provides no explicit guidance on
this question. As a result, the Court is left to develop its own
answers to such basic questions as which branch of the Court
should make the decision, as well as when and how to exit.
A.

"Who Decides?

In the absence of direct guidance from the Rome Statute,
the three obvious contenders for decisionmaker are the Prose
cutor, the judges, and the ASP. Of these options, the Prosecu
tor would seem to have the greatest institutional competence
for the task. The states of the ASP are not involved with any of
the Court's situations in a granular way. And, although the
judges gain detailed knowledge of any given situation through
the cases that are presented to them, they cannot be expected
to have the same awareness as the Prosecutor of the range of
possible future cases in a situation.
Article 42 of the Rome Statute provides for an indepen
dent Prosecutor with "full authority" over the staff and re
sources of the OTP57 and responsibility for conducting investi
gations and prosecutions. 58 While the Rome Statute says noth
ing explicit about exiting situations, the principle of
complementarity advanced in the Statute, not to mention the
finite resources of the Court, means that states could not have
intended for the ICC to stay permanently involved in every sit
uation it entered. As a result, the Prosecutor's discretion to
exit can be implied through the authority that states have dele
gated under the Statute. This reading of the Statute makes
most sense in terms of the comparative institutional competen
cies involved. However, placing the exit decision in the hands
of the Prosecutor would not necessarily mean excluding the
judges or the ASP altogether. One could consider, for in
stance, bolstering the legitimacy of the Prosecutor's exit deci
sions by way of judicial review, for which there may already be
a statutory mechanism.
The Rome Statute clearly gives the Pre-Trial Chamber au
thority to review the Prosecutor's decision not to open a new
investigation when that decision is taken in the interests of jus
tice. 59 And if, after an investigation, the Prosecutor decides
57. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 42(2).
58. Id. art. 42(1).
59. Id. art. 53(3)(b).
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not to prosecute, again "in the interests of justice," the Cham
ber can review that decision as well. 6° From the face of the
text, one could argue that the Chamber has the authority to
exercise this latter power of review for new cases in situations
where prosecutions have already been undertaken. But the
text could equally be construed as limiting this review power to
the first prosecution in a new situation. And, unfortunately,
the drafting history of the Statute fails to clarify whether the
Chamber's power only applies to situations in which the Prose
cutor decides not to pursue any prosecutions in the first place,
or also includes situations where prosecutions underway are
now being brought to a close. 61
Assigning exit decisionmaking to the judiciary, however,
may bring its own risks. The Rome Statute assigns the judges a
solely judicial role, and the adjudication of a case is distinct
from the political and logistical considerations that will almost
inevitably be involved in an exit decision. In the words of IC1Y
Judge Patricia Wald, in her partial dissent from a case on ap
peal in which the majority decided to end proceedings on the
grounds of judicial economy,
[It] is the job of the Prosecutor who must calibrate
legal and policy considerations in making her choices
on how to utilize limited resources. To recognize a
parallel power in judges to accept or reject cases on
extra-legal grounds invites challenges to their impar
tiality as exclusively definers and interpreters of the
law. 62
60. Id.
61. See Morten Bergsmo & Pieter Kruger, Articl,e 53, in COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS'
NoTEs ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1073 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008). Based on
the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II to convene a status conference to in
quire whether the Prosecutor had decided to close the Uganda investigation
after five warrants of arrest had already been issued, it would seem that those
judges at least believe that article 53(3)(b) grants them the authority to re
view the Prosecutor's decision not to pursue further prosecutions even after
the prosecution phase is underway. Situation in Uganda, No. ICGOI/04-01/
05-68, Decision to Convene a Status Conference on the Situation in Uganda
in Relation to the Application of Article 53, ,r 13 (Dec. 2, 2005). The record
of the status conference itself has not been made public.
62. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeal Judgment, Partial
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wald, 1[1[ 4, 14 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For
mer Yugoslavia July 5, 2001).
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Nonetheless, Wald's views on this may be a particular product
of her background and training in the U.S. domestic legal sys
tem. In civil law systems, the prosecutor's discretion is compar
atively limited, and in instances where the prosecutor is given
more latitude,judicial oversight may be seen as appropriate. 63
Overall, in light of the substantial challenges facing the OTP
as it develops a framework for exit decisionmaking, it does
seem advisable for it to pursue a position that accepts a Pre
Trial Chamber review of its exit decisions as a component of a
strategy for safeguarding the legitimacy of such decisions.
With respect to the ASP, the Rome Statute assigns it "man
agement oversight" of the Court's administration,64 and to the
extent the decision to exit falls within the administration of
the Court, the ASP could provide another procedural check
on the Prosecutor's discretion. However, the experience of the
ad hoc tribunals highlights the risks involved in handing exit
decisions to the ASP. The states of the ASP fund the Court,
just as the states of the United Nations fund the ad hoc tribu
nals. Leaving exit decisions to these funders, as has been the
case with both the IC1Y and ICTR, risks a situation where exit
is driven primarily by financial considerations, rather than by
the justice needs of the situation. 65
63. This is the situation in France, for instance, where an investigating
judge, rather than the prosecutor, orders an indictment upon finding that
the facts in the case constitute a crime. C. PR. PEN. art. 181 (Fr.) cited in
Margaret M. deGuzman & William A. Schabas, Initiation of Investigations and
Sel,ection of Case, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES AND
RuLES 161 (Goran Sluiter et al. eds., 2013).
64. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 112(2) (b).
65. See, e.g., Cecil Aptil, Closing the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda: Compl,etion Strategy and Residual Issues, 14 NEw ENG.J. lNT'L & CoMP.
L. 169, 169-70 (2008) (describing how the financial concerns of state
funders generated "pressure on the officials of these international tribunals
to complete their work"); Dominic Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and its Compl,e
tion Strategy: Efforts to Achieve Accountability for War Crimes and Their Tribunals, 3
J. lNT'L CRIM. JusT. 82, 95 (2005) ("The IC1Y Completion Strategy was, to
some extent, born from the ongoing debate about the cost-efficiency of its
activities."); Daryl A. Mundis, The judicial Effects of the "Compl£tion Strategies" on
the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. lNT'L L. 142, 157-58
(2005) (decrying the detrimental impact of a date-driven completion strat
egy on due process at the ad hoc tribunals). But see Larry D.Johnson, Closing
an International Criminal Tribunal Whil,e Maintaining International Human
Rights Standards and Excluding Impunity, 99 AM.J. INT'L L. 158, 160-61 (2005)
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Assuming the interpretation advanced in this Article is
correct, and that the Prosecutor is responsible for exit deci
sions, then even if the judges and/or ASP provide oversight,
the discretionary power in the hands of the Prosecutor is sig
nificant. But this would not be the first time the Prosecutor has
dealt with high-stakes discretionary decisions.

1. Prosecutorial Discretion at the ICC
The birth of the ICC spurred a body of scholarship on
how the first Prosecutor should use his discretion to determine
what situations to investigate and which cases to prosecute-in
other words, decisions of entry. Given the centrality of
prosecutorial discretion to the question of exit, it is worth re
viewing this literature in order to extract any lessons on discre
tionary decisionmaking by the Prosecutor that should be con
sidered when developing a framework for discretionary deci
sionmaking with respect to exit. But first, a few caveats.
In many respects, exit presents the flipside of the issues
regarding entry that the first wave of literature on
prosecutorial discretion engaged with. Like the choice of
which situation to enter, exit decisions impact the Court's le
gitimacy in the eyes of its stakeholders. And like entry, exit
decisions also reflect the decisionmakers' view of the goals of
the original intervention. But the expressive function of entry
and exit are different. With respect to victims, for instance, the
entry of the ICC into a situation signals that they have faced
some of the most serious crimes of concern to humanity and
that, although their government is not in a position to account
for them, the ICC will. But exit will not necessarily express the
opposite. Given the scale of crimes in the situations where the
ICC is currently involved, and the debilitated state of the do
mestic judiciary in most of those situations, the ICC's exit may
not mean that all of the worst crimes have been accounted for,
or that a victim's own government is now able to prosecute any
outstanding cases. 66
(arguing that Mundis overestimated the negative impact of the completion
strategy on due process).
66. Moreover, in practical terms, exit raises new issues, including how to
account for residual functions, like the oversight of post-conviction deten
tion, and legacy issues, such as the archiving of trial material. See, e.g., Kevin
Jon Heller, LEUVEN CENTRE FOR GLOBAL STUDIES, COMPLETION STRATEGIES
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Exit will not typically be the mere mirror of entry from a
statutory perspective either. The Rome Statute ensures that
the Court only enters a situation when the relevant domestic
justice system is unable or unwilling to conduct its own prose
cutions. 67 But given both the current state of the domestic sys
tems in many of the situations in which the Court operates,
and the resource and cooperation constraints facing the
Court, exit may need to be undertaken before the relevant do
mestic system becomes willing and able to prosecute.
With these caveats in mind, the existing literature on dis
cretionary decisionmaking can provide useful insights to guide
the Prosecutor's decisionmaking regarding exit.
a.

Legitimating Discretionary Decisions Through Good Process

One of the first, and still most widely cited, pieces on
prosecutorial discretion at the ICC was written by Allison Mar
ston Danner. 68 The Article opens by comparing the ICC Prose
cutor's discretion to that of his counterparts at the ICTY and
ICTR, finding that, unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC "vests
the power to investigate and prosecute the politically sensitive
crimes within its broad territorial sweep in a single individual,
its independent Prosecutor."69
Danner emphasized the reality that the ICC relies entirely
on states for the enforcement of its decisions. 70 She argued
that the way to counterbalance this structural weakness was for
the Prosecutor to build the legitimacy of the Court, and that
the Prosecutor's discretionary powers should be put in service
of this goal. 71
Acknowledging that democratic elections, the usual basis
for legitimacy in a liberal domestic setting, were unavailable to
the ICC, and that scholars had developed other bases of legiti
macy for international institutions, Danner nonetheless de
clined to offer "an alternative comprehensive theory of legiti(2009), available at http:/ /www.ipp.ghum.kuleuven.be/publications/heller
.pdf.
67. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17.
68. Danner, supra note 48.
69. Id. at 510.
70. Id. at 535.
71. Id. ("In order to cope with the weaknesses of the ICC's enforcement
regime . . . the Prosecutor must seek to enhance the Court's legitimacy.").
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macy" 72 that might be applicable to a treaty-based Court with
multiple constituencies. Instead, she drew on Abram and An
tonia Chayes' account oflegitimacy as applied to norms of in
ternational law. 73 The result was a focus on good process, char
acterized by principled, reasoned, and impartial decisionmak
ing, which Danner argued would be facilitated by the
publication of criteria to guide prosecutorial discretion, akin
to what is done in many domestic jurisdictions. 74
This focus on good process permeated much of the first
wave ofliterature. 75 And, at least initially, a consensus seemed
to have emerged around Danner's argument that the Prosecu
tor could build legitimacy by fostering good process through
the formulation and public promulgation ofex ante criteria to
guide what situations to enter and which cases to prosecute. 76
72. Id.
73. See ABRAM CHAVES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAVES, THE NEw SoVER
EIGNTI: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 127-34
(1995) (describing legitimacy as demanding a "fair and accepted procedure"
that is applied equally and satisfies basic minimum standards of "fairness and
equity").
74. Danner, supra note 48, at 537-38.
75. See, e.g., Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Prosecutorial Discretion Before Na
tional Courts and International Tribunals, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JusT. 124, 142 (2005)
(arguing that enhanced transparency shields prosecutorial decisionmaking
from error and abuse); Brian Lepard, How Should the ICC Prosecutor Exercise
His OT Her Discretion? The Role ofFundamental Ethical Principles, 43 J. MARsHALL
L. REv. 553, 558-62 (2010) (arguing for the role of key ethical principles in
the use of prosecutorial discretion); David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Juris
diction, Legality, and the Legitimacy ofInternational Criminal Law, in THE PHILOS
OPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 569, 579 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas
eds., 2010) (arguing that the legitimacy of international tribunals comes
"from the manifested fairness of their procedures and punishments").
76. See, e.g., AVRIL McDONALD & RoELOF HAVEMAN, PROSECUTORIAL Dis.
CRETION-SOME THOUGHTS ON "OBJECTIFYING" THE EXERCISE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION BY THE PROSECUTOR OF THE ICC 2-3 (2003),
available at http://www.issafrica.org/anicj/uploads/McDonald-Haveman_is
sues_relevant.pdf ("It seems to be of vital importance that guidelines are
developed - and made public - giving direction to the decision either [sic]
or not to initiate an investigation."); Hector Olasolo, The Prosecutor of the ICC
Before the Initiation of Investigations: A QuasiJudicial OT a Political Body?, 3 INT'L
CRIM. L. REv. 87, 143 (2003) (arguing for a set of "precise and binding"
criteria for prosecutorial discretion to be introduced into the ICC's Rules of
Evidence and Procedure); Philippa Webb, The ICC Prosecutor's Discretion Not
to Proceed in the "Interests ofJustice", 50 CRIM. L.Q. 305, 324 (2005) (arguing in
favor of ex ante criteria to guide prosecutorial discretion).
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Such ex ante criteria are also something that the Prosecu
tor could consider adopting with respect to exit. One could
imagine the Prosecutor issuing a policy statement with a
checklist of standards to guide her decisionmaking regarding
exit. But as the following section demonstrates, the ex ante
criteria approach has not senred the Court particularly well to
date in terms of shielding the Prosecutor's discretionary deci
sions from criticism. Of course, it is unrealistic to imagine that
any discretionary decision of the Prosecutor would be met with
uniform acceptance, given the high stakes of the issues and
diversity of the stakeholders involved. But the degree to which
the ex ante criteria approach has failed to serve as a bulwark
against criticisms of the Court's legitimacy is nonetheless strik
ing when compared to what the first wave of scholars on the
topic expected, and many of the same failings of the ex ante
criteria approach in relation to entry may apply equally to dis
cretionary decisionmaking on exit.
b.

Ex Ante Criteria

The Court's first Prosecutor responded favorably to the
policy prescriptions arising from the early scholarship recom
mending the use of ex ante criteria to demonstrate principled
entry decisionmaking, initially releasing a draft policy paper
on his prosecutorial strategy77 and then circulating a set of cri
teria to guide the OTP's selection of situations and cases. 78 In
practice, however, this ex ante criteria approach has not ful77. Int'! Criminal Court, Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office
of the Prosecutor (2003), availab/,e at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/
1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b 7-8b25-60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf.
78. Int'I Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Criteria for Selection
of Situations and Cases 1-7 (2006) (unpublished policy paper) (on file with
author). This was followed, in 2007, by a public paper on criteria to be con
sidered when exercising discretion not to enter a situation, and in 2010 by
criteria on the opening of a preliminary investigation, which has recently
been updated. See Int'! Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Draft Policy
Paper on The Interests of Justice (2007), availab/,e at http://icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-432l-BF09-73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPin
terestsOijustice.pdf; lnt'I Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Draft Pol
icy Paper on Preliminary Examinations (2010), availab/,e at http://www.icc
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9FF1EAAI -41C4-4A30-A202-l74B18DA923C/2825
15/OTP_Draftpolicypaperonpreliminaryexaminations04101.pdf; lnt'I Crim
inal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examina
tions, supra note 41.
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filled its promise of protecting the Court's legitimacy. Instead,
the Prosecutor's decisions over both what situations to enter
and which cases to prosecute have been mired in controversy.
The situation in Uganda is a case in point. The OTP
opened its Uganda investigation in 2004, after the President of
Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, referred the situation to the Court.
From the outset, the situation attracted controversy.
Museveni's referral asked the OTP to investigate solely those
crimes allegedly perpetrated by a rebel group in northern
Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). 79 The Prosecu
tor's December 2003 joint appearance with Museveni in
London to announce that Uganda had given the ICC its first
referral led human rights organizations to question the Prose
cutor's impartiality and fuelled concerns that the Court was
being used by Museveni as a tool to persecute his opponents. 80
Human rights advocates quickly pointed out that there were
allegations of serious crimes committed by Museveni's govern
ment forces in northern Uganda as well. 81
The Prosecutor's subsequent announcement of his deci
sion to open an investigation made clear that he did not in
tend to limit his investigation to only one party. 82 However,

79. Int'! Criminal Court, Press Release, President of Uganda Refers Situa
tion Concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, (Jan. 29,
2004), availabl,e at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20
media/press%20releases/2004/Pages/president%20of%20uganda%20re
fers%20situation00%20concerning%20the%20lord_s%20resistance%20ar
my%20_lra_%20to%20the%20icc.aspx.
80. Michael Atim & Marieke Wierde, Justice at Juba: International Obliga
tions and Local Demands in Northern Uganda, in COURTING CONFLICT? JusTICE,
PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 22 (Nicholas Waddell & Phil Clark eds., 2008).
81. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Press Release, ICC: Investigate All
Sides in Uganda (Feb. 5, 2004), availabl,e at http://www.hnv.org/news/
2004/02/04/icc-investigate-all-sides-uganda ("Violations committed by the
UPDF include extrajudicial killings, rape and sexual assault, forcible dis
placement of over one million civilians, and the recruitment of children
under the age of 15 into government militias.").
82. Int'! Criminal Court, Press Release, Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court Opens an Investigation into Northern Uganda (July 29,
2004), availabl,e at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and
%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/ press%20releases/Pages/
prosecutor%20of%20the%20international%20criminal%20court%20opens
%20an%20investigation%20into%20nothern %20uganda.aspx.
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the only arrest warrants to date have been issued for members
of the LRA. 83
According to the Prosecutor, while his office investigated
allegations against all groups, arrest warrants were justified for
the LRA first because their crimes were the gravest, and the
OTP's ex ante criteria emphasized the need to prioritize the
gravest crimes.84 However, the Prosecutor's persistent refrain
that his office simply acted consistently with its previously an
nounced criteria has done little to quell the controversy.85
In addition to being criticized for what situations the OTP
has entered, the Prosecutor has also been attacked for the situ
ations the OTP has not entered. One such controversy was
over the decision not to open an investigation into allegations
of crimes committed by British soldiers in Iraq. Notwithstand
ing the Prosecutor's publicly circulated explanation, which
emphasized the small number of victims and connected the
decision to the ex ante OTP criterion of considering the num
ber of victims when assessing whether the statutory standard of

83. Situation in Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-53, Warrant of Ar
rest for Joseph Kony Quly 8, 2005); Situation in Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/
04-01/05-54, Warrant of Arrest for Vincent Otti Quly 8, 2005); Situation in
Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-56, Warrant of Arrest for Okot
Odhiambo Quly 8, 2005); Situation in Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/0557, Warrant of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen Quly 8, 2005); Situation in
Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-55, Warrant of Arrest for Raska Lukwiya
Quly 8, 2005).
84. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court, Statement to the Informal Meeting of Legal Advisors of Ministries of
Foreign Affairs, 7 (Oct. 24, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/9D70039E-4BEC-4F32-9D4A-CEA8B6799E37/143836/LMO_2005
1024_English.pdf ("[I]n Uganda, the criterion for selection of the first case
was gravity . . . Our investigations indicated that the crimes committed by
the LRA were of dramatically higher gravity ...we have continued to collect
information on allegations concerning all other groups, to determine
whether other crimes meet the stringent thresholds of the Statute and our
policy are met.") (emphasis added).
85. See, e.g., Matthew Happold, International Criminal Court and the Lord's
Resistance Anny, 8 MELB.J. INT'L LAw 160, 171-72 (2007) (noting with skepti
cism the likelihood that warrants will ever be issued for members of the
UPDF).
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gravity is met, 86 the decision opened the Prosecutor to charges
of politicization.87
Prosecutorial decisions with respect to which cases to pur
sue have been even more contentious. Most recently, the pur
suit of cases against sitting heads of state in Sudan and Kenya
have drawn attention to the Court's all-African docket and led
the Chairperson of the African Union to claim that the Prose
cutor is "race-hunting" Africans. 88 In response, the OTP has
pointed to the ex ante criteria in its policy paper on the selec
tion of situations and cases, noting that "[£] actors such as geo
graphical or regional balance are not relevant criterion [sic]
for a determination that a situation warrants investigation
under the Statute."89 Nonetheless, in October 2013, the Afri
can Union held an emergency meeting to discuss whether it
should withdraw en masse from what many African heads of
state argue is a politicized court. 90 Although blanket with
drawal did not proceed, the Kenyan parliament has voted to
86. Letter from the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC in Response to Commu
nications Received Concerning Iraq (Sept. 9, 2006), availabf.e at http://www
.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F596D08D-D8 l 0-43A2-99BB-B899B9C5BCD2/
277422/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf ("The Office
considers various factors in assessing gravity. A key consideration is the num
ber of victims of particularly serious crimes, such as willful killing or rape.
The number of potential victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court in this situation - 4 to 12 victims of willful killing and a limited num
ber of victims of inhuman treatment - was of a different order than the
number of victims found in other situations under investigation or analysis
by the Office.").
87. See, e.g., Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Sef.ec
tion at the International Criminal Court, 33 M1cH. J. INT'L L. 265, 298-99 (2012)
(arguing that by refusing to pursue allegations of crimes committed by Brit
ish officials in Iraq, while opening a preliminary examination into allega
tions of crimes committed by North Korean soldiers, the Prosecutor "seems
to be currying favor with powerful states"); William Schabas, Prosecutorial Dis
cretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT'L CRIM.
JusT. 731, 742-43 (2008) (criticizing the decision not to open an investiga
tion in Iraq where British soldiers were alleged to have killed civilians).
88. Aislinn Laing, International Criminal Court Is "Hunting" Africans, TELE
GRAPH, (May 27, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africa
andindianocean/ 10082819 /International-Criminal-Court-is-hunting-Afri
cans.html (quoting AU Chairperson Hailemariam Desalegn).
89. Int'! Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Prelim
inary Examinations, supra note 41, at 3.
90. Faith Karimi, African Union Accuses ICC of Bias, CNN (Oct. 12, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/l O/12/world/africa/ethiopia-au-icc-summit/.
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leave the Court,91 and a draft U.N. Security Council resolution
to suspend the ICC's cases against Kenyan President Uhuru
Kenyatta and his deputy, William Ruto, was only narrowly de
feated.92
The views of many citizens in Africa differ from their lead
ership, and there is strong support for ICC prosecutions
among segments of both the Sudanese and Kenyan popula
tions.93 But the fact that so many states who initially joined the
Court are now openly considering withdrawal indicates that re
lying on ex ante criteria as the primary means of legitimating
the Prosecutor's discretionary decisions has not been as suc
cessful as scholars had initially hoped, giving pause to any sug
gestion that the same model be used for exit decisionmaking.
c.

Bey ond the Ex Ante Approach

While the trend within the first wave of literature was
strongly in favor of ex ante guidelines as a way to shield the
Prosecutor from criticism about the way he used his discretion,
a minority of scholars raised concerns about the approach.
In a thoughtful 2007 paper, Alexander Greenawalt argued
that the kinds of dilemmas that are subject to prosecutorial
discretion at the ICC may be so politically complex and con
text-specific as not to be amenable to ex ante legal standards at
all. 94 Moreover, he worried that the guidelines approach was
tied "to a domestic administrative law model, which is rooted
in a democratic legitimacy that the ICC inherently lacks."95 He
proposed, instead, that in times of ongoing crisis or political
transition, the Prosecutor defer to political actors about
whether or not to pursue prosecutions, reasoning that they
91. Edmund Blair, Kenya Parliament Votes to Withdraw from ICC, REUTERS
(Sept. 5, 2013), http:/ /www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/05/us-kenya-icc
vote-idUSBRE9840PB20130905.
92. Michelle Nichols, African Bid for Kenya Trials DejlfTTal Fails at U.N. Se
curity Counci� REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/
2013/ll/l 5/uk-kenya-icc-un-idUKBRE9AE0S020131115.
93. Robert Wanjala, Kenya Victims Relieved lry Refusal to Postpone ICC Cases,
Au.AFRICA (Nov. 18, 2013), http:/ /allafrica.com/stories/201311190492
.html; Interviews with Darfurian refugees at the Oure Cassoni refugee camp
(Aug. 2008) (on file with author).
94. Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics: Prosecutorial Discre
tion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 583, 654
(2007).
95. Id. at 656.
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would have more specialized knowledge of the political dy
namics involved. 96 Of course, such a proposal is not without its
own problems, and as Greenawalt himself recognized, it would
"come at a cost to the ideal of an independent Prosecutor vig
orously pursuing investigations in the face of political weak
ness. "97 Yet, if the alternative is for the Prosecutor to have to
delve into what are essentially political decisions, then the out
sourcing of such decisions to political actors may, in fact, serve
as the best means of protecting the institutional integrity of
the ICC.98
Greenawalt's concerns about the political nature of dis
cretionary decisions of what situations to enter arguably apply
with even more force to the question of exit. The Rome Stat
ute requires the Prosecutor elected by the ASP to be an indi
vidual "of high moral character [and] be highly competent in
and have extensive practical experience in the prosecution or
trial of criminal cases."99 Meanwhile, a well-managed exit from
a situation is likely to require a level of context-specific local
knowledge and political judgment that may not be within the
skill set of someone chosen for their prosecutorial experience.
As a result, credible challenges to the Prosecutor's expertise
for this task could well be raised.
To insulate itself from these challenges, the OTP might
consider consulting with those who have expertise the Prose
cutor lacks. Under the statutory interpretation advanced in
this Article, the decision to exit would still need to be taken by
the Prosecutor. But one could envisage the OTP establishing
an Exit Guidance Committee for each situation, comprised of
local representatives and country-area experts with more legiti
macy than the Prosecutor on the implications of ICC exit for
the domestic justice system and local political dynamics.
More recently, Margaret deGuzman has developed an al
ternative critique of ex ante criteria, arguing that "good pro
cess is not enough." 100 In her view, any criteria will inevitably
be so indeterminate that the Prosecutor's claim that such stan
dards were the basis for selection decisions may, in fact, under96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 660-69.
Id. at 660.
Id.
Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 42(3).
deGuzman, supra note 87, at 289.
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mine the Court's legitimacy, instead generating suspicion that
the Prosecutor's own preferences filled in the gaps in the crite
ria.101 For deGuzman, legitimacy will continue to be a problem
for the ICC unless the criteria used to make prosecutorial deci
sions are connected to goals and priorities that the Court's
stakeholders accept.102
With respect to exit, deGuzman's concern that good pro
cess will be insufficient as long as the ultimate goals of the
Court remain contested presents a sign ificant challenge. A
lack of consensus around the goals of the ICC among and
within the Court's various constituents means that there is un
likely to be agreement over what constitutes an appropriate
basis for exit in the medium term. Some groups believe the
goal of the ICC is prevention or retribution, while others be
lieve it is establishing an accurate historical record, reconcilia
tion, deterrence, or advancing the rule of law.103
There is a large, and growing, body of scholarly work
presenting normative arguments in favor of the various philo
sophical underpinnings of international criminal law.104 Be
tween these competing views there is an important question of
whose voices should be amplified. If, as some contend, justice
is to serve the victims of internationally recognized crimes,
then their views must be taken into account. And yet, victims
are no more a monolith than any other group of actors in this
101. Id. at 296. deGuzman's concern about the inevitability of indetermi
nate guidelines echoes Greenawalt, who worried that "[t]he kind of guide
lines that provide for meaningful ex ante decisional rules likely to demon
strate the ICC Prosecutor's impartiality may not be the kind likely to em
brace the full complexity and contingency of each situation." Greenawalt,
supra note 94, at 656.
102. deGuzman, supra note 87, at 299.
103. See, e.g., MARK DRUMBL, ATROCI1Y, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
LAw 149-80 (2007) (discussing retribution, deterrence, and expressivism);
Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethink
ing the Contribution ofJustice to Reconciliation, 24 HuM. RTs. Q. 573, 586 (2002)
(discussing truth-telling, punishing perpetrators, promoting healing for vic
tims, advancing the rule of law, and facilitating national reconciliation).
104. See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 87, at 298-99; Alexander Greenawalt,
International Criminal Law for Retributivists, 35 U. PA. J. OF INT'L L. 101, 102
(forthcoming 2014) (on file with author); Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive
Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and
the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39 (2007); An
drew K. Woods, Moral judgments & International Crimes: TheDisutility ofDesert,
52 VA. j. INT'L L. 633 (2011).
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realm. 105 Which of competing victims' voices should be heard?
If, on the other hand, advancing the rule of law is a core prior
ity, then perhaps legal professionals deserve more say.
One way to navigate through these competing views is to
consider the question from the perspective of accountability, a
close cousin of legitimacy. Who among the Court's constitu
ents has the power to hold the Prosecutor accountable for her
discretionary decisions? Traditionally, the power to hold deci
sionmakers accountable has rested with those who have dele
gated the authority, as the ASP has done with respect to the
Prosecutor. 106 Indeed, for some commentators, this formal, hi
erarchical relationship remains the only true form of account
ability.107 Given that the ASP is responsible for funding the
Court, there is good reason for the Prosecutor to prefer its
views.108 From a normative standpoint, one might object to the
notion that those with financial power have more influence
than the victims in whose name the Prosecutor acts, and the
experiences of the ad hoc tribunals' funder-driven completion
strategies provide a sobering warning in this respect. Yet the
views of the ASP cannot be discounted altogether, since with105. A comprehensive smvey of Darfuri refugees,for instance,found that
more than half believed there should be ethnically based collective responsi
bility for the crimes committed against them, whereas one third believed
that only the individuals who committed crimes should be held to account.
Jonathan Loeb et al.,Darfurian Voices: Documenting Darfurian Refugees' Views on
Issues of Peace, Justice and Reconciliation, 24 HOURS FOR DARFUR,http://static
.squares pace.com/static/ 52920ed5e4b04a0741daa89c/t/ 529224ffe4b049dd
Oca09a3f/1385309439460/Darfurian% 20Voices%20-%20Report%20-%20
English.pdf (last visited Oct.1,2014).
106. See, e.g., Mark Pallis, The operation of UNHCR's Accountability Mecha
nisms, 37 N. Y.U. J.INT'L L. & Pot.. 869,870 (2006) (observing that the dele
gation model of accountability is currently the most popular).
107. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Adminis
trative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REv., 2073,2075 (2005) (explaining that "true
accountability . .. [involves] .. . hierarchy,monitoring, reporting, internal
rules,investigations,and job evaluations"); but see Sabino Cassese,Administra
tive Law Without the State? The ChaUenge of Global Regulation, 37 N.Y. U.J.INT't.
L. & Pot.. 663,688 (2005) (arguing that a post-hierarchical mode of account
ability is both possible and desirable in the international realm).
108. Of course, the ASP itself is not a monolith,and to the extent there
are divergent views,one might expect the perspectives of the largest donor
countries,namely Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom,France,and Italy,
to hold sway.
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out funding, no one could be prosecuted, precluding success
on any metric, regardless of viewpoint.
This traditional analysis of accountability relations is, how
ever, open to challenge. Descriptively speaking, Mark Bovens
draws a useful distinction between "vertical" and "horizontal"
accountability relationships, with only the former involving re
lationships where the constituency has the formal power to im
pose consequences on the authority concerned. 109 Under this
framework, the Prosecutor is engaged in a vertical accountabil
ity relationship with the ASP, but a horizontal relationship
with the victims and witnesses of the situations she enters. The
latter have no formal power to sanction the Prosecutor, but
they can readily frustrate her work by refusing to cooperate
with an investigation or, more indirectly, by generating nega
tive publicity about the Prosecutor's investigative activities.
Furthermore, although one might argue that once the OTP
has exited a situation, those victims and witnesses lose that·
power, this may be too simplistic a conclusion.
As Julia Black points out, in the polycentric regulatory
context, the accountability ecosystem involves an evolving set
of interrelationships. 110 In an interconnected world, one
could imagine victims and witnesses in one situation reaching
out in solidarity to poison or strengthen the Prosecutor's fu
ture relationship with the victims and witnesses of the next sit
uation the OTP enters.
In sum, the underlying goals of the Court are contested
and likely to remain so in the medium term, and the OTP ig
nores any of the constituencies that can hold it accountable at
its own peril. But waiting for an imagined future point at
which there is broad consensus among the Court's constitu
ents over the goals to be achieved before exit generates its own
significant problems. 111 Thus, it seems likely the OTP will
need to start planning for exit, even in the face of this ongoing
process of contestation.
109. Mark Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual
Framework, 13 EuR.j. L. 447,460 (2007). Nico Kirsch advances a normative
defense of a pluralist,rather than hierarchical, framework of accountability,
based on the deficits of a given constituency. Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of
Global Administrative Law, 17 EuR. J. INT'L L. 247,272-74 (2006).
110. See generally Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Ac
countability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GoVERNANCE 137 (2008).
111. See supra Part I.
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B. When and How to Exit
The lack of guidance from the Rome Statute compels the
search for comparative experiences upon which the ICC can
draw in developing its own process for exit decisionmaking.
The ICTR's final appeal is scheduled for completion in
2015,112 and the IC1Y anticipates that its final trial will be held
in 2016. 113 Already, a residual mechanism is in operation to
handle the legacy issues of both tribunals, 114 and the exper
iences of these ad hoc tribunals as they wind down their opera
tions have generated a number of lessons from which the ICC
could learn. 115 However, because of the ICC's status as a per
manent institution, the considerations involved in the exit of
the ICC from a situation differ from those of the ad hoc tribu
nals.
Even for a temporary institution, the costs of a poor exit
are high. As the IC1Y has found, when constituents feel an
exit has been badly managed, it can color their perceptions of
the intervention as a whole. 116 But for a permanent institution
like the ICC, the stakes are even higher, since a poor exit is
likely to impact the ongoing credibility of the institution and
its associated ability to undertake future interventions.
112. President of the ICTR, &port on the Compktion Strategy of the Interna
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ,r 18, U.N. Doc. S/2013/663 (Nov. 13,
2013).
113. Compktion Strategy, IC1Y, http://www.icty.org/sid/10016 (last visited
Sept. l, 2014).
114. Mechanism for International Tribunals, IC1Y, http://www.icty.org/sid/
10874 (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).
115. See, e.g., Heller, LEUVEN CENTRE FOR GLOBAL STUDIES, supra note 66,
at 33-44; Fausto Pocar, Compktion or Continuation Strategy? Appraising Prob'-ems
and Possibl,e Deuel,e,pments in Building the Legacy of the ICTY, 6 J. INT'L CRIM.
JusT. 655 (2008) (arguing for completion to be viewed as a continual project
that involves an effort to strengthen the rule of law in domestic settings).
There are also more than twenty Completion Strategy Reports available on
the IC1Y and ICTR websites. Reports and Publications, IC1Y, http:/ /www.icty
.org/sections/AbouttheIC1Y/ReportsandPublications (last visited Oct. 1,
2014); !CTR Compktion StratefsY, ICTR, http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/
ICTRCompletionStrategy/tabid/118/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 1,
2014).
116. See Giovanna M. Frisso, The Winding Down of the ICTY: The Impact of the
Compktion Strategy and the Residual Mechanism on Victims, 3 GoETTINGEN J.
INT'L L. 1093, 1120-21 (2011) (arguing that the IC1Y completion strategy
instrumentalized victims, negatively affecting their perceptions of the legiti
macy of the trials).
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U.N. peacekeeping operations have been struggling with
these risks for decades. Of course, the goals of a peacekeeping
intervention are different from an international judicial inter
vention, and the control the U.N. Security Council has over
peacekeeping operations is more akin to the control the
Council has over the ad hoc tribunals than to its relationship
to the ICC. 117 However, the analogy between peacekeeping
exit and ICC exit is relevant in the sense that in both cases,
exit from one situation must be undertaken while other situa
tions remain active, and with the knowledge that new situa
tions will need to be entered into in the future.
For the ICC and the United Nations alike, there is a con
stant cost-benefit calculation in play, since the continuation of
operations in one situation uses resources, both financial and
political, that could be deployed in other current or future sit
uations. For the ICC, launching an investigation into a new
situation is a resource-intensive activity; institutional knowl
edge of the new situation needs to be built from scratch. While
the benefits of the first case in a new situation might be
greater than the eighth case in an existing situation (the im
pact of a shift from total impunity to the start of accountability
is presumably greater than the shift from start of accountabil
ity to further accountability), the costs will be greater, too. Also
true for both the ICC and U.N. peacekeeping is that the
reputational impact of a poor exit on current and future oper
ations is an ever-present risk.
A report of the U.N. Secretary General, issued in 2001, is
instructive. Reviewing exits from the U.N. peacekeeping oper
ations of the nineties, the report explains that while an unsuc
cessful intervention reflects badly on the legitimacy of
peacekeeping as a tool in general, and that exit following the
successful completion of a mandate is optimal, in reality exit
must often be considered in circumstances of failure or, most
commonly, partial success. 118
117. Although the Rome Statute gives the U.N. Security Council the
power to refer situations to the ICC, the ICC's relationship to the Council
differs from the ad hoc tribunals in that the ICC was created by treaty, and
not by the U.N. Security Council. As such, the ICC is not a U.N. body.
118. U.N. Secretary General, No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Deci
sion-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Opera
tions, U.N. Doc. S/2001/394 (Apr. 21, 2001).
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While the ultimate goals of the ICC's activities are subject
to ongoing contestation,119 at least from a statutory perspec
tive the Preamble to the Rome Statute establishes the goal of
an "end to impunity" for perpetrators of the most serious in
ternational crimes.120 Potential refinement of this sweeping
mandate is discussed in Part III, but taking the preambular
language at face value, it seems that the Court will inevitably
need to exit situations where something less than an end to
impunity has been achieved, since it deals with crimes that oc
cur on such a scale that the prosecution of all perpetrators will
ordinarily be a financial and logistical impossibility. And, as
the Secretary General's Report warns, "it is in the grey area
between clear success and failure that a decision [to exit] be
comes complex."121
As Richard Caplan notes with respect to U.N. peacekeep
ing operations, "[t]he reasons for partial success or failure are
germane to the formulation of exit strategies."122 The same
would seem to be true for the ICC. For instance, the Court
would need to consider its approach to exit differently in a
situation where states have refused to execute the remainder
of the Court's arrest warrants than in a situation where the
OTP has failed to get arrest warrants in the first place because
of a lack of access to the investigation site.123
Reflections from U.N. peacekeeping operations also high
light the role that states play in determining the likely success
of an exit strategy.124 This attention to actors beyond the con
trol of the international institution in question is similarly rele
vant to the ICC.Just as a U.N. peacekeeping operation cannot
accomplish sustainable peace without financial and political
support from states for transitional arrangements as
peacekeepers exit, so too the ICC cannot hope to fulfill the
119. See supra Part II.Al.iii.
120. Rome Statute, supra note 11, pmbl.
121. U.N. Secretary General, supra note 118, ,r 55.
122. Richard Caplan, Exit Strategi,es and State Building, in EXIT STRATEGIES
AND STATE Bun.DING, supra note 15, at 3, 8.
123. See infra Part III.B.
124. See U. N. Secretary General, supra note 118, ,r 52 ("No matter how
carefully a mission is conceived and tailored to the circumstances, it cannot
succeed .. . without the timely contribution and deployment of personnel,
material and funds [by Member States].").
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ideal of ending impunity unless the capacity of domestic jus
tice mechanisms is strengthened.
Recognition of the ICC's dependency on states is nothing
new. The Court's need for cooperation from states is clear
from the Rome Statute, and the question of the relationship
between the Court and domestic jurisdictions was one of the
most discussed topics in the first decade of scholarship on the
ICC. 125 There are views along a spectrum as to whether the
Prosecutor should be in a competitive or cooperative relation
ship with domesticjurisdictions. 126 And views differ as to how
passive or active the OTP should be in its approach to comple
mentarity, with some maintaining that the OTP should stay at
arm's length from domesticjurisdictions, 127 while others argue
that the OTP should "motivate and assist" national judiciar-

125. See, e.g., John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts Versus the
ICC, in l THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CouRT: A
COMMENTARY 667 (Antonio Cassese et al., eds. 2002) (analyzing the relation
ship between the ICC and national courts); Burke-White, supra note 7 (argu
ing for the Prosecutor to pursue a policy of "proactive complementarity" by
encouraging and assisting domestic prosecutions); Mohamed El Zeidy, The
Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal
Law, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 869 (2002) (providing a comprehensive history of
the development of the principle of complementarity); Federica Gioia, State
Sovereignty, Jurisdiction and Modern International Law: The Principle of Comple
mentarity in the International Criminal Court, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1095 (2006)
(arguing that complementarity is crucial to the realization of the goal of
ending impunity for international crimes); Kevin]. Heller, The Shadow Side of
Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due Pro
cess, 17 CRIM. L. F. 255 (2006) (concerned that complementarity will expose
defendants to national proceedings that lack due process); William A.
Schabas, Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 19 CRIM.
L. F. 5 (2008) (arguing that the kind of cooperative relationship between the
ICC and a State that is present in instances of self-referral is inconsistent with
the underlying purpose of the Rome Statute); Carsten Stahn, Complementar
ity: A Tale of Two Notions, 19 CRIM. L. F. 87 (2008) (arguing that a cooperative
relationship between the ICC and a State is consistent with a "positive" read
ing of complementarity, grounded in the Rome Statute).
126. See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 125 (arguing that the kind of cooperative
relationship between the ICC and a State that is present in instances of self
referral is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the Rome Statute). Cf
Stahn, supra note 125.
127. See, e.g., Seils, supra note 3, at 1012 ("There are very good reasons for
the OTP not to be involved in anything to do with national prosecutions.").
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ies. 128 What is not in dispute is that, as with peacekeeping op
erations, states have a vital role to play in determining the suc
cess of the Court's activities.
Finally, lessons from U.N. peacekeeping operations coun
sel that exit must be understood as a process, not a singular
point. 129 As with the kind of interventions undertaken by the
ICC, realities on the ground are dynamic, and the decision of
when to exit must be sufficiently flexible to take into account
the impact of changing circumstances. One could imagine a
scenario in which the ICC planned to exit on the basis of an
assessment that domestic justice mechanisms were capable of
prosecuting crimes in the situation, only to find months later
that a military coup unraveled gains the domestic system had
made. 130 As a result, a successful exit strategy must be de
signed around benchmarks, such as whether the domestic jus
tice system is able to undertake prosecutions of outstanding
cases, rather than on specific dates for withdrawal. 131
Ill.

TOWARD A SOLUTION

The core of the problem identified in this Article is that
the ICC needs to start thinking about a plan for exiting ex
isting situations in the absence of any pre-existing guidance on
how to go about doing so. Because the Court is a permanent
institution, a poor exit decision has the potential to under
mine not only perceptions about the Court's work in the situa
tion it is leaving, but also perceptions of the Court as an insti
tution that is active in other situations, both now and in the
future. Given the ICC's high level of dependency on the coop128. See, e.g., Burke-White, supra note 7, at 54 ("[T]he ICC could partici
pate more directly in efforts to encourage national governments to prose
cute international crimes themselves.").
129. U.N. Secretary General, supra note 118; Dominik Zaum, Exit and In
ternational Administrations, in EXIT STRATEGIES AND STATE BUILDING, supra
note 15, at 137, 144-45.
130. The Rome Statute appears to account for such scenarios with respect
to investigations that the Prosecutor has agreed to defer at the request of the
State, with such a referral being open to review "any time when there has
been a significant change of circumstances based on the State's unwilling
ness or inability genuinely to carry out the investigation." Rome Statute,
supra note 11, art. 18.
131. See C aplan, supra note 122, at 10-11 (describing the problems with
deadlines and benefits of a benchmark system for exit strategies).
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eration of external actors, these perceptions can affect the
Court's ability to carry out its mandate. With such high stakes
involved, both the procedural and substantive aspects of exit
decisionmaking must be carefully developed.
A. Defining Success for the Purpose of Exit
Although the Rome Statute offers no explicit guidance on
exit, it does provide several parameters within which the deci
sion must be taken. Combining these statutory parameters
with the policies to which the OTP has committed itself over
the past decade generates a working definition of success for
the purposes of exit: The OTP will have succeeded when the
main perpetrators of the main types of victimization across the
gravest incidents in a situation have been prosecuted by the
ICC, or will be prosecuted by domestic authorities in the fu
ture.
In an ideal world, the ICC would only exit a situation after
having achieved this goal. But as the experiences of U.N.
peacekeeping operations indicate, this ideal will rarely be
achieved. 132 Before considering how scenarios of partial suc
cess or failure might impact exit decisionmaking, however, I
first describe the statutory and policy provisions from which
this Article's working definition of success emerges.
1.

Statutory Parameters

The Rome Statute is clear that the ICC "shall be comple
mentary to national criminaljurisdictions." 133 The majority of
article 17 is dedicated to putting this principle into effect, and
the ICC Appeals Chamber has provided clear guidance on
how to assess whether the domestic prosecution of a particular
case renders it inadmissible before the ICC. 134 In an ideal, al132. See supra Part II.B.
133. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 1.
134. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga Against
the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility
of the Case, ,r 82 (Sept. 25, 2009) (confirming that the inadmissibility test
involves two stages, the first of which is to establish if the case is being investi
gated or prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction over it; only if the case is
being investigated or prosecuted do the "unwilling or unable" tests need to
be addressed). See al,so Darryl Robinson, The Inaction Controversy: Negkcted
Words and New opportunities, in l THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND

44

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 47:1

beit unlikely, situation where all remaining cases were being
pursued at the domestic level in a way that satisfied article 17
guidelines, this would be an obvious situation for the ICC to
exit.
Beyond the issue of complementarity, article l 7(d) and
article 21 (3) also give the Prosecutor guidance on when a par
ticular prosecution must not be pursued. With regard to arti
cle 17(d), which states that "the case is not of sufficient gravity
to justify further action by the Court," the case law interpreting
the article remains unsettled. In Lubanga, Pre-Trial Chamber I
tried to establish a highly prescriptive interpretation of what
constituted a sufficiently grave case to avoid an inadmissibility
determination under article l 7(d), delineating criteria for the
assessment of the gravity of both the alleged crime and respon
sibility of the alleged perpetrator. 135 However, this decision
was overturned by the Appeals Chamber, which rejected the
Trial Chamber's criteria and also found that the determina-

COMPLEMENTARITI': FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 460 (explain
ing admissibility as a two-step test, and noting that commentators often over
look the first step of determining whether a state is investigating or prosecut
ing, or has investigated or prosecuted, a case). Cf Schabas, Prosecutorial Dis
cretion v. judicial Activism, supra note 87, at 757 (accusing the Pre-Trial
Chamber in Lubanga of having "invented" the criterion of inactivity in its
article 17 analysis).
135. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8
Decision Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I's Decision of 10 February 2006
and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case Against
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ,r 63 (Feb. 24, 2006) (requiring an affirmative
answer to the following three questions: "(i) ls the conduct which is the ob
ject of a case systematic or large scale (due consideration should also be
given to the social alarm caused to the international community by the rele
vant type of conduct)? (ii) Considering the position of the relevant person
in the State entity, organisation or armed group to which he belongs, can it
be considered that such person falls within the category of most senior lead
ers of the situation under investigation?; and (iii) Does the relevant person
fall within the category of most senior leaders suspected of being most re
sponsible, considering (1) the role played by the relevant person through
acts or omissions when the State entities, organizations or armed groups to
which he belongs commit systematic or large-scale crimes within the jurisdic
tion of the Court, and (2) the role played by such State entities, organisa
tions or armed groups in the overall commission of crimes within the juris
diction of the Court in the relevant situation?").
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tion of the responsibility of an alleged perpetrator cannot be
made on "excessively formulistic grounds." 136
The Court has, however, suggested that the guidelines
given by the Rules on Evidence and Procedure with respect to
the determination of sentences might be relevant in a gravity
analysis. 137 This means that in considering whether a case can
proceed under article 17 ( d), it is legally valid to consider "the
extent of the damage caused, in particular the harm caused to
the victims and their families, the nature of the unlawful be
havior and the means employed to execute the crime; the de
gree of participation of the convicted person; the degree of
intent; the circumstances of manner, time and location; and
the age, education, social and economic condition of the con
victed person." 138
In the absence of any guidance as to how to weigh the
various factors against each other, this list cannot provide any
determinative assistance to the Prosecutor in deciding whether
to exit a situation. But invoking these factors as part of an ex
planation of exit would at least be one means of bolstering the
statutory legitimacy of any decision. For example, if all the re
maining cases in a situation involved crimes that caused lim
ited damage and were perpetrated by people who were elderly,
the Prosecutor could turn to article 17 ( d) to help justify her
decision to exit the situation. In practice, of course, such a sce
nario is unlikely. In most instances, the Prosecutor will be
faced with remaining cases that are of equivalent severity to
136. Situation in the DRC, Case No. ICC-01/04-169, Judgment on the
Prosecutor's Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled
"Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58",
,r 73 Quly 13, 2006) (criticizing the lower chamber's reasoning that the
Court's deterrent effect would be strengthened by only prosecuting those in
positions to issue orders and stating that it would be "more logical to assume
tliat the deterrent effect of the Court is highest if no category of perpetrators
is per se excluded from potentially being brought before the Court"). Id. ,r
78 (finding tliat the Pre-Trial Chamber's proposed test was inconsistent with
a contextual reading of the Statute as a whole-for instance, only prosecut
ing those who issue orders would render superfluous the need for article 33
of the Statute, which states that superior orders are no defense).
137. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Carda, Case No. ICC-02/0502/09, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ,r 31-33 (Feb. 8, 2010).
138. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE
55 (2d ed., 2013) (Rule 145(1) (c)).
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those previously prosecuted, thus rendering the list related to
article 17 (d) of little use.
Article 21 (3) of the Statute directs the OTP's attention to
the principle of impartiality and prevents the Prosecutor from
pursuing a prosecution on account of the alleged perpetra
tor's personal characteristics, such as gender, race, religion, or
political affiliation. 139 As such, the Prosecutor could turn to
the Statute to help legitimate her decision to exit a situation by
drawing on article 21 (3) in a scenario where the primary rea
son for pursuing additional cases would be to demonstrate
parity across ethnic lines.
Any framework developed to guide decisions about what
situations to exit should take the principles underlying articles
17 and 21 (3) into account. However, these provisions alone
are almost certainly under-determinative. One can readily im
agine a scenario in which all of the OTP's existing situations
involve current and future cases that continue to satisfy all of
the statutory requirements, and yet a decision on exit must be
taken.

2. Policy Parameters
In terms of drawing on guidance the OTP has already de
veloped, one goal seems clearly relevant: While "the [OTP]
mandate does not include production of comprehensive his
torical records for a given conflict, incidents are selected to
139. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 21 (3). The principle of equality
before the law was, of course, established in core international human rights
documents (and in many domestic jurisdictions) long before the Rome Stat
ute was drafted. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 14, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, art. 7, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (Dec. 10,
1948). However, evidence from the ad hoc tribunals suggests that establish
ing such a prohibited purpose on the part of the Prosecutor is not easy. For
example, IC1Y judges found that a defendant seeking to challenge his in
dictment on the grounds that the Prosecutor was discriminating on the basis
of his religion would have to establish "an unlawful or improper (including
discriminatory) motive for the prosecution" and "that other similarly situ
ated persons were not prosecuted." The suspect could not meet the stan
dard, and his challenge was rejected by the court. Prosecutor v. Delalic
("Celebici case"), Case No. IT-96-21-A,Judgment, ,i 611 (Int'] Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia, Feb. 20, 2001).
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provide a sample that is reflective of the gravest incidents and
the main types of victimization."140
However, applying this "gravest incidents" prong is by no
means simple. In addition to the ambiguity that already exists
around the article l 7(d) gravity standard, how should the OTP
think about similarly grave incidents that occur in different
time periods or geographic locations? 141 If, in its DRC investi
gation, the OTP had decided to exit after having prosecuted
the gravest incidents in lturi but not in the Kivus, would its
record have failed to provide a representative sample of the
gravest incidents? What if, in its Darfur investigation, the OTP
were to exit after having prosecuted the gravest incidents from
2004, but not from 2011?
Less complicated is the "main types of victimization"
prong, which would preclude exiting before prosecuting a par
ticular category of crimes, say gender-based violence, if such
crimes were a central feature of the overall criminality. Relat
edly, the OTP might consider supplementing this prong to en
sure that the main types of perpetrators are also prosecuted
before the OTP closes its investigation. The OTP policy that
"parity within a situation between rival parties" is not relevant
to the selection of cases142 is entirely appropriate and neces
sary to avoid article 21 (3) concerns that no one be prosecuted
140. Int'l Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutorial Strategy
2009-2012, supra note 19, ,r 20.
141. The jurisprudence of Rule llbis cases at the IC1Y is instructive in
terms of competing ways of viewing whether a "gravest incidents"-type stan
dard has been met. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/1-PT,
Prosecution's Further Submissions Pursuant to Chamber's Order of 9 Febru
ary 2005, ,r 4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Feb. 21, 2005)
(arguing that although crimes it alleged had been committed by Dragomir
Milosevic were very grave, "they were already tried before the International
Tribunal in [Galic] and are now well documented in that judgment"). The
Court, however, denied the prosecution's request to send the Dragomir
Milosevic case for prosecution at the domestic level, noting that although
Rule 11bis does not require it to consider the historical record, even if it did,
the Court would decide that prosecution should continue at the interna
tional level on the grounds that the crimes allegedly committed by Dragomir
Milosevic covered a different time period from those committed by Galic.
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/1- PT, Decision on Referral of
Case Pursuant to Rule 11bis, ,r 20 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugosla
via, July 8, 2005).
142. Int'! Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutorial Strategy
2009-2012, supra note 19, ,r 39.
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solely on account of party affiliation. But there is an important
difference between a lack of parity and a distorted representa
tion of which types of actors committed serious crimes. 143 Con
cern for representing the main types of perpetrators before
exiting a situation would preclude exiting the Uganda situa
tion, for instance, until some serious crimes committed by gov
ernment forces have been prosecuted.
B.

A Decisionmaking Framework

By pulling together the statutory prescriptions of articles
17(d) and 21(3), along with the guidelines that the OTP has
already developed with respect to other forms of discretionary
decisionmaking, we can see the working definition of success
for the purposes of exit emerge: Success is when the main per
petrators of the main types of victimization across the gravest
incidents in a situation have been prosecuted by the ICC, or
will be prosecuted by domestic authorities in the future.
To the extent this definition draws on goals the OTP has
set for itself, which are far from settled in the eyes of the
Court's various constituencies, it follows that the definition is
open to contestation. Victims may be concerned that so-called
"lesser" perpetrators-people that they witnessed killing their
families, rather than those who issued orders from headquar
ters-will not be prosecuted before the ICC exits the situation.
International lawyers and victims alike might disagree with the
OTP's assessment of what constitutes the gravest incidents in a
situation. But as the first scholarship on this issue, my goal
here is not to establish a definitive metric of success, but in143. The situation in Rwanda illustrates this point. There is unquestiona
ble parity between the crimes committed by the perpetrators of the 1994
genocide and those committed by the RPF as it sought to stop them. Yet the
RPF are alleged to have committed serious crimes, none of which have been
prosecuted at the ICTR. As Human Rights Watch explains, "a failure also to
address the RPF' s killing of tens of thousands of civilians will result in serious
impunity for grave crimes committed in 1994 and would leave many with a
sense of one-sided, or victor's, justice. Such a result would seriously under
mine the Tribunal's legacy." Human Rights Watch, Letter to the Prosecutor of

the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Regarding the Prosecution of RPF
Crimes (May 26, 2009), available at http:/ /www.hrw.org/node/83536. The

Defence at the ICTR has also tried to push the Prosecution to investigate
alleged RPF crimes, though with no success. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kabiligi,
Case No. ICTR-97-34-1, Decision on Defence Motion Seeking Supplementary
Investigation, ,i,r 19-22 Qune 1, 2000).
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stead to put forward a plausible option in the hope of spurring
discussion among the Court's stakeholders about precisely
what the metric should be.
Combining this definition with the insights from
peacekeeping operations that exit is best conceived of as a pro
cess guided by benchmarks, and that while exit following suc
cess is ideal, exit must also sometimes be considered in situa
tions of partial success or failure, yields a decision tree repre
sented in Graph 1.
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Under the proposed definition, success turns ultimately
on prosecution, either by the ICC itself or by domestic authori
ties. But as shown in Graph 1, the exit decisionmaking process
begins much earlier, and starts with the question of whether
arrest warrants have been issued in accordance with the above
criteria. If they have not been, the first question, represented
on the left-hand side of the graph, is why.
It could be that the OTP has been unable to gather
enough evidence to make a full set of successful warrant appli
cations to the Pre-Trial Chamber because it is being barred
from the investigation site, as is currently the scenario with its
Sudan cases. If there is no prospect of cooperation from the
situation state, this is a scenario in which the OTP might con
sider signaling its intention to exit the situation.
This approach has the benefit of avoiding the trans
parency problems present in Uganda, where the situation re
mains formally open, but the OTP has not secured arrest war
rants for a representative sample of the crimes. 144 Stakehold
ers have been left to speculate as to why no government forces
have been charged, and allegations of bias by the OTP are
common. 145 The OTP could avoid ending up in such a situa144. See supra Part II.A.I. In drawing this comparison, I am not suggesting
that the reason for the one-sided pattern of warrants in the Uganda situation
is a denial of access to investigative sites. My point is simply that the failure of
the OTP to narrate a credible reason for a non-representative sample of war
rants is problematic, and in a future scenario in which sample problems
arise as the result of a non-cooperative domestic state, the OTP would be
well advised to explain this publicly.
145. See, e.g., Happold, supra note 85 (noting it is unlikely that warrants
will ever be issued for members of the UPDF). The official OTP summary of
its first three years of operation maintained that while the first arrest war
rants were for LRA members, analysis of alleged crimes by other groups was
ongoing. Int'! Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor, Report on the Activi
ties Performed During the First Three Years (June 2003-June 2006) (Sept.
12, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D76A5D89-FB
64-4 7A9-9821-725747378AB2/l 43680/OTP_3yearreport20060914_English
.pdf. The OTP has not maintained the practice of issuing three-yearly up
dates. But some, including the judges of the pretrial chamber, have ques
tioned whether the investigation is actually ongoing. In 2005, the prosecutor
stated that the Uganda investigation was "nearing completion." Prosecutor v.
Joseph Kony, Case No. ICG02/04-0l/05-67, Registration in the Record of
Proceedings of Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Informal Meeting of Le
gal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, New York, 24 October 2005, 1
(Dec. 2, 2005). Referring to this statement, Pre-Trial Chamber II convened a
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tion by instead communicating clearly the reasons it has not
sought arrest warrants for a representative sample of the
crimes committed, thereby ensuring the blame would be
placed where it belongs, such as on an uncooperative situation
state. Still, the outcome is the least satisfactory of all the exit
possibilities explored in Graph 1, as it gives situation states
seeking to avoid accountability an easy way out. Once the OTP
exits under such circumstances, states will learn that they can
avoid ICC action if they deny the OTP access to investigative
sites for long enough that it eventually gives up.
An alternative explanation could be that a representative
sample of arrest warrants have not yet been issued simply be
cause investigations are ongoing. In such a scenario, the OTP
could continue investigations through to completion or, if
there is an indication that domestic authorities might be mov
ing toward a position of being both interested in and capable
status conference, seeking to establish whether the Prosecutor had closed
the Uganda investigation. Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/0401/05-68, Decision to Convene a Status Conference in the Investigation in
the Situation in Uganda Under Article 53 (Dec. 2, 2005). The subsequent
status conference was non-public, but before the conference, the OTP
lodged a public filing stating that it had not made a decision not to conduct
further prosecutions. Prosecutor v.Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/0576, OTP Submission Providing Information on Status of the Investigation in
Anticipation of the Status Conference to Be Held on 13 January 2006, ,r 2
Qan. 11, 2006). The OTP also stated that regarding alleged crimes by the
Ugandan government forces, its "inquiries and analysis of information and
potential evidence related to these allegations are ongoing." Id. ,i 7. Since
then, however, no new arrests have been made, and official OTP reports on
the status of investigations have often excluded updates on investigations in
Uganda. See, e.g., Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, Address to the Eighth Session of the Assembly of States Par
ties (Nov. 23, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
CDF496C7-7BA7-4AA3-B670-l EE85BC3E3E8/28 l 268/20091l 18ASPspeech
.pdf; Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,
Address to the Assembly of States Parties (Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP9/Statements/ICC-ASP9-statements
LuisMorenoOcampo-ENG.pdf (noting the need to present, or evaluate the
need to present, new cases in existing investigations in Darfur and the Dem
ocratic Republic of Congo, but making no mention of the possibility of new
cases in Uganda). In the absence of either an acknowledgment by the OTP
that it has effectively closed the Uganda situation or, if the situation remains
open, an explanation as to why there have been no arrest warrants since
those sought for LRA members in 2005, allegations of partisanship seem
certain to continue.
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of taking over investigations, the OTP could signal its future
intention to exit in the hope of catalyzing the domestic system
to action. 146
Turning to the right-hand side of the decision-tree, if ar
rest warrants have been issued for a sample that reflects the
OTP's goals, the next benchmark to consider is enforcement.
If there has been foot-dragging by states over the enforcement
of arrest warrants, the OTP might communicate that it will not
wait for the enforcement of warrants indefinitely and that it is
developing an exit strategy. One might argue that, much like
exiting after being denied access to an investigative site, exit in
the face of enforcement failure gives states seeking to avoid
accountability an easy way out. But unlike access to investiga
tive sites, warrant enforcement is not solely dependent on the
situation state. Defendants travel, and when they do, there is
an opportunity for other states, including those with much less
interest in avoiding accountability than the situation state, to
arrest them. There may be reluctance to incur the diplomatic
costs of arresting the national of another state, but that is all
the more reason to counter this reluctance with pressure for
enforcement from the ICC. The threat of exit could build a
sense of urgency that supports this goal.
Once arrest warrants have been executed, the final bench
mark relates to whether the ICC has completed the trials and
appeals of all defendants. In the perhaps rare scenario where
this is the case, the OTP can exit under the banner of success.
Equally, if the domestic system becomes willing and able to
take over the remaining cases, 147 the OTP would also be justi
fied in exiting, again claiming success.
In the more likely scenario, where domestic capacity is
not yet strong enough to complete the investigation and prose
cution of outstanding cases, the OTP could communicate its
desire to exit in the hope of spurring not only the situation
state, but also institutions and non-state actors in the interna
tional community who could support the project of capacity
building, to prepare the domestic justice system to take on the
remaining cases.
As discussed earlier, much scholarly attention has been
devoted to the dependence of the ICC on states with respect to
146. See infra Part III.C.
147. Infra Part III.C.
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the opening of situations and conduct of investigations. What
should be clear from Graph 1 is that the ICC's dependence on
states has significant implications for the question of exit as
well.

C.

Exit as Opportunity

The assessment of when to exit a situation is complex
enough in purely theoretical terms, let alone in practice. How
ever, the Prosecutor must remember that although exit will
bring substantial challenges, it can also be framed as a way of
revitalizing the system of complementarity.
In 2008, William Burke-White wrote that "the OTP's most
powerful tool to encourage national prosecution is the threat
of its own investigation, as such an investigation would likely
impose significant sovereignty costs on the states affected." 148
In practice, genuine national prosecutions have not been
spurred by the threat of ICC action, 149 and Burke-White's al
ternative concern that the ICC might facilitate a "free-rider
problem" 150 has been the more characteristic outcome. In
deed, a recent book-length treatment of the subject concludes
that the literature's early expectation that the threat of ICC
involvement would catalyze domestic proceedings has barely
occurred at all. 151
In its preparation for the 2010 Rome Statute Review Con
ference, the Bureau of Stocktaking on International Criminal
Justice concluded that it was of "paramount importance that
the complementary justice system of the Rome Statute is
148. Burke-White, supra note 7, at 86.
149. NoUWEN, supra note 8.
150. Burke-White, supra note 7, at 69. In more recent work, Burke-White
has recognized that the approach of "proactive complementarity" that he
espoused in 2008 has not been adopted by the OTP, largely for fear of the
perception that it would politicize the Court. Writing in 2011, he suggests
that the OTP could reframe complementarity not as engaging in domestic
politics, but as part of a screening function akin to what U.S. federal prose
cutors do in their relations with state criminal justice systems. William W.
Burke-White, Re.framing Positive Compkmentarity: Reflections on the First Decade
and Insights from the US Federal CriminalJustice System, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, supra
note 1, at 360 (suggesting the ICC Prosecutor reconsider complementarity,
"drawing on [gate-keeping and case selection functions within] the US fed
eral criminal justice system").
151. NoUWEN, supra note 8.
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strengthened and sustained." 152 More thought must be given
to ways of increasing the incentives for national authorities to
pursue accountability themselves, and the need to exit a situa
tion presents a new opportunity to develop this thinking. 153
The spurring of domestic prosecutions as a component of
an exit strategy is one dimension in which lessons from the ad
hoc tribunals may be relevant for the ICC. The primacy that
the U.N. tribunals have over domestic jurisdictions places
them in a different relationship to national courts than the
ICC, but one example from the completion strategy of the ad
hoc tribunals does seem particularly relevant to ICC exit,
namely, the cooperation with domestic jurisdictions to com
plete outstanding cases.
Cases in which the ad hoc tribunals have already issued
indictments are handed over to domestic prosecutors under
Rule 11 bis, which sets the standards under which such a trans
fer can occur. 154 Were the ICC to adopt a similar process,
there would be a strong argument that once an ICC arrest war
rant is issued, the Court has a responsibility to ensure that,
regardless of where that defendant is actually prosecuted, he
or she receives the same level of international rights protec
tions he or she would have received at the ICC. 155 This, in
turn, would require additional Court resources in order to as
sess domestic standards, and so may not bring huge efficiency
gains over simply continuing to prosecute the cases directly.
152. Int'! Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau
on Stocktaking: Complementarity, Mar. 22-25, 2010, ,r 49, ICC-ASP/8/51
(Mar. 18, 2010), available at http:/ /www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP
SR/ICC-ASP-8-51-ENG.pdf.
153. As one commentator warns, however, domestic prosecutions should
be seen "as a problem in their own right, not a solution to the ICC's capacity
constraints." Marlies Glasius, A Problem, Not a Solution: Complementarity in the
Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo, in 2 THE INTERNA
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARI'IY. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE,

supra note 1, at 1204.
154. IC1Y, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. llbis, U.N. Doc. IT/32/
Rev.44 Quly 24, 2009) (providing guidelines for the transfer of cases from
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to domestic
courts); !CTR, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. llbis(c), U.N. Doc. IT/
32/Rev.19 (Feb. 9, 2010).
155. Once a defendant is brought to the ICC, he or she can rely on "inter
nationally recognized human rights" standards to protect his or her rights.
Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 21(3).
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Nevertheless, such oversight is certainly possible, as it has been
undertaken by both the IC1Y and ICTR in their I Ibis cases. 156
Perhaps more promising as a component of an exit strat
egy for the ICC would be something akin to what the IC1Y has
called Category Two cases. These are cases in which the tribu
nal undertook investigations but never actually issued indict
ments. In an effort to close the IC1Y on the timeline desired
by its U.N. funders, the IC1Y began passing Category Two case
information, gathered in the course of its investigation, over to
the domestic authorities.
The Rome Statute provides for exactly this kind of infor
mation sharing. The Court may provide assistance to a State
Party conducting an investigation into ICC crimes or serious
crimes under the national law of the state, and such assistance
shall include "[t]he transmission of statements, documents or

156. In both the IC1Y and ICTR, this issue was formally incorporated into
the requirements that judges authorizing the referral of cases back to domes
tic jurisdictions had to consider. See IC1Y, supra note 154 (stating that the
IC1Y referral bench must be satisfied that "the accused will receive a fair
trial and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out"); ICTR,
supra note 154 (stating the same requirement). Until recently, the ICTR had
consistently denied the Prosecutor's requests to refer cases to Rwanda. See,
e.g., Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-Rllbis, Decision on the
Prosecution's Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule llbis, ,r 38
(Oct. 9, 2008) (upholding the trial chamber's refusal to grant the Prosecu
tor's request to transfer the case to Rwanda under Rule 11bis for reasons
including that Munyakazi's right to obtain the attendance of, and to ex
amine, defense witnesses under the same conditions as witnesses called by
the prosecution cannot be guaranteed at this time in Rwanda); Prosecutor v.
Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-Ellbis, Decision on the Prosecution's
Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, ,r 38 (Dec. 4, 2008)
(upholding the trial chamber's refusal to grant the Prosecutor's request to
transfer the case to Rwanda under Rule 11bis, including on the grounds that
in Rwanda, Hategekimana "may face life imprisonment in isolation without
adequate safeguards, in violation of his right not to be subjected to cruel,
inhumane and degrading treatment"). However, in 2011, the trial chamber
permitted a referral to Rwanda for the first time. Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi,
Case No. ICTR-2001-75-Rllbis, Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Refer
ral to Republic of Rwanda (June 28, 2011). The decision was upheld on
appeal with the requirement that the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights submit monthly monitoring reports on the case. Prosecutor
v. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-01-75-ARllbis, Decision on Uwinkindi's Against
the Referral of his Case to Rwanda and Related Motions (Dec. 16, 2011).
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other types of evidence obtained in the Court of an investiga
tion ...by the Court."157
The process only works if one has a receptive domestic
jurisdiction.Therefore, it is not an opportunity that will be re
alized in all instances. But where a state is interested in using
material gathered by the ICC to further accountability, or
could be incentivized to become interested by others con
cerned about impunity in the face of a looming ICC exit, it
could be useful for the ICC Prosecutor to adopt this Category
Two-type approach as part of an overall exit strategy.
Of course, this approach would also entail consideration
of the obligations that may flow from it.Would the provision
of information under article 93(10) burden the OTP with
some level of responsibility ( and thus additional resources) for
how that information is used?What about states that are keen
to receive information from the Court but do not have the
capacity to prosecute cases according to international stan
dards?158 Unlike the Rule llbis cases, however, in instances
where the defendants were never indicted at the international
level in the first place, the case for an extended period of re
sponsibility is less clear.159

If the ICC were to follow the path of the IC1Y on this type
of information sharing, then the provision of information to
national authorities before the arrest warrant stage of proceed
ings would not be enough to attach responsibility to the ICC
for a defendant's subsequent treatment.As former IC1Y Dep
uty Prosecutor David Tolbert explained with respect to Cate
gory Two cases, " [ t] he national prosecuting authorities are on
157. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 93(10) (b) (i).
158. See generally Heller, The Shadow Side of Compl,ementarity: The Effect ofArti
de 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due Process, supra note 125, at 255 (dis
cussing the effect complementarity has on the likelihood defendants will re
ceive due process in national proceedings).
159. Views on this will undoubtedly diverge. There are good reasons for
actors within the international community to be cautious of supporting pros
ecutions with less than stellar human rights credentials, but as Frederic
Megret argues, human rights organizations that push too far in the direction
of demanding that domestic jurisdictions reform to the point where they are
capable of taking on trials that are equivalent to what takes place in the
Hague may be making the perfect the enemy of the good, and losing valua
ble legal diversity in the process. Frederic Megret, Too Much of a Good Thing?:
lmpl,ementation and the Uses of Comp!,ementarity, in l THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI
NAL COURT AND CoMPLEMENTARl'IY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE, supra note 1.
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their own, for good or ill." 160 With an eye both to resource
constraints and to fears of a perceived or actual loss of inde
pendence if the OTP engaged too closely with domestic prose
cutions, the ICC's approach should probably be the same. This
is not to say, however, that other actors outside the Court
could not take on an oversight role. 161
CONCLUSION

The first decade of scholarship on the ICC devoted much
attention to issues related to the Court's entry into new situa
tions. This scholarship reflected the focus of the Court itself
and its need to garner a caseload to establish its viability in the
face of much skepticism about whether the newly minted insti
tution would actually work in the real world. But as the Court
enters its second decade of operations, it is time to shift this
focus to the new challenges that loom for the Court.
This Article has described the reasons for the ICC to start
thinking about when and how to exit situations in which it is
currently active. The driving concern is that for the ICC to stay
in any situation without developing an exit strategy risks creat
ing a moral hazard scenario that undermines complementar
ity, one of the key principles upon which the Court was
founded.
Beyond this "complementarity imperative" toward exit,
the de facto permanent presence of the Court in any given
situation may ultimately breed concerns over the Court's effi
ciency, especially among the states that fund the Court. This
would further strain what is already a precarious scenario for
the Court, which is entirely dependent upon states for the re
sources needed to conduct its operations. Already, current re
source constraints have meant that, in order to enter new situ
ations, the ICC prosecution is under-staffing existing situa
tions. This approach is having a detrimental effect on the
quality of its work and, in turn, the reputation of the Court.
This Article has argued that the best way to address this re
source squeeze would be for the Court to consider exiting
160. David Tolbert & Aleksander Kontic, IC1Y: Lessons in Complementarity,
in 2 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARI'IY: FROM THE
ORY TO PRACTICE, supra note 1.
161. Indeed, this is what the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in
Europe is doing with respect to Category Two cases in Bosnia- Herzegovina.
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some situations before entering new ones. Yet, even in a world
of unlimited resources, the complementarity imperative would
stand alone as a compelling reason for exit planning.
While this Article has argued for the need to consider
exit, it has also noted the risk that if such exit decisions are
handled poorly, the Court will suffer reputational costs that
will undermine its ability to carry out its mandate in the future.
Yet, the question of how to handle exit decisions raises an im
mediate problem for the ICC, namely the complete dearth of
guidance from existing statutory sources about how to make
an exit decision.
Filling this void, this Article has developed a framework to
guide exit decisionmaking. While centered around a working
definition of success, developed from both statutory and policy
parameters, the framework recognizes that the ICC may need
to exit situations under circumstances of only partial success
or, indeed, failure. Even under these sub-optimal outcomes,
however, there is the possibility that exit, signaled in advance,
could have a catalytic effect on the activities of states, advanc
ing the statutory principles of cooperation and complementar
ity. Thus, as much as exit is a problem for the ICC, this Article
has shown that exit may also have a salutary side, presenting
the Court with an elegant means of aligning its resource man
agement with its statutory goals.
As the first work to focus on the question of exit for the
ICC, this Article has made the need for further scholarly atten
tion to this previously unexplored issue clear. But, although
the question of exit is a novel one for the ICC, several of the
dimensions involved in exit, such as prosecutorial discretion
and complementarity, are issues that the ICC has been grap
pling with since its inception. Seen in this light, the question
of exit provides scholars of international criminal law an op
portunity to revisit the literature written in the first decade of
the ICC's existence and to assess the extent to which expecta
tions and assumptions within that body of work have been
met.

